

THE
FABLE AS A STYLISTIC TEST
IN
CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE

BY
HERBERT THOMPSON ARCHIBALD

AN ESSAY IN WHICH IS INCORPORATED A DISSERTATION PRESENTED IN 1901 IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE
J. H. FURST COMPANY

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TO
PROFESSOR BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE
AN INSPIRING TEACHER
AND TRUE FRIEND

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THE FABLE IN CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE.

I. INTRODUCTION.

1. INTRODUCTORY.

Of all the distinctly popular elements which enter into formal literature, none except Proverb is so various and adaptable and yet so distinctive in its use as the Fable. This is particularly true for Greek and Roman literature, as is evidenced by the large number of authors using the Fable. The following long list of writers either use it directly or make definite allusion to it: Hesiod, Archilochus, Timocreon, Herodotus, Aristophanes, Xenophon, Plato, Antisthenes, Aristotle, Callimachus, Ennius, Lucilius, Horace, Livy, Phaedrus, Petronius, Plutarch, Lucian, Babrius and Avianus. And while use or even allusion is not extensive in any author save Horace and the fabulists Phaedrus, Babrius and Avianus, nevertheless the sphere and color of the Fable in each case are notably clear and distinct. Indeed so great is the versatility and yet so distinctive the individuality of the Fable, that it is quite possible to make the Fable itself in its varied treatment a true touchstone of style for each of the authors mentioned and the various departments represented. It is even possible in some cases to make the Fable a test of the influence of one author or department upon another. It only needs, to give continuity as well as perspective to the study, that the treatment follow the chronological order. This will, therefore, be the general order followed, after a preliminary discussion of the terminology, scope and general stylistic qualities of the Fable. The present study will, however, cover only the literature from Hesiod to Aristotle.

2. TERMINOLOGY OF FABLE.

The nomenclature of Fable is various, but, as in English, it is everywhere generic, nowhere specific. The earliest Greek word we know for Fable is *aĩnos*. It occurs in Hesiod, *Op.*, 202 (if genuine), twice in Archilochus (*frg.* 86, 89), and later in Callimachus, *frg.* 93. Although a poetical word, *aĩnos* became eventually the technical term for Fable (Quintil., *inst. or.*, 5, 11, 20) chiefly, doubtless, because Fable was first called by that name in literature. In the early period, *aĩnos* (*αἰνέω*) is a generic term for "the thing said," like *μῦθος*, and later, *λόγος*; the three terms being applied to Proverb and the like as to Fable. For example, *aĩnos* signifies "proverb" in Eur., *frg.* 508; but "tale" in Hom., *Od.*, 14, 508. (Cf. also Jebb on Soph. *Phil.*, 1380, where *aĩnos* means "counsel.") So *μῦθος* means "saying" in Aesch., *Choëph.*, 314; "tale" in Eur., *Ion.*, 336; while *λόγος* means "saying" in Pind., *N.* 9, 6; *P.* 1, 35 (cf. Gildersleeve, *Comm.*) and even "riddle" in Eustathius, 1634, 17 (*λόγος ἐν λόγῳ*). See Ohlert, *Rätsel der Griechen*, p. 238. This use of *λόγος* in the sense of "riddle," might suggest a connection in meaning between *aĩnos* and *αἶνιγμα*; but only in later time, when the feeling for the figurative had grown dull, was the Fable, *aĩnos*, regarded as enigmatical. (Cf. Eustath., *Il.*, 713, 12; Theon, *Walz* 1, 175; Ohlert, *op. cit.*, p. 76, 238). Aesop himself in Plut., *Conviv. Sept. Sap.*, being even made a proposer of riddles (cf. Ohlert, p. 75). In like manner the term *αἶνιγμα* was in later time applied to proverbs which had then become obscure (Ohlert, *op. cit.*, p. 78). We cannot say, therefore, with Keller (*Fleck. Jahrbücher Supp.*, iv, p. 310) that *aĩnos*, "fable," connotes "a dark saying," any more than that it is essentially paraenetic, which Keller himself has disproved.

The term more commonly applied to Fable in classical times was *λόγος* (cf. Theon, *Sp.* 2, 73, *W.* 1, 174). Herodotus (*II*, 134) calls Aesop *λογοποιός*. Cebes in Plato, *Phaedo*, 60D, speaks of *τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους*. So with Trygaeus in Aristoph., *Pax*, 129 (cf. Arist., *Rhet.*, 2, 20, 9; *λόγοι οἶον οἱ Αἰσώπειοι*;

Xen. Mem., 2, 9, 13, τὸν τοῦ κυνὸς λόγον). λόγος may be either true or false, as is shown by the phrase λογος ψευδής (Aphthon., W. 1, 59, Sp. 2, 21, cf. Pind., O., 1, 28, Gildersleeve, Comm., and Plato, Rep., 2, 376E). λόγος sometimes denotes falsehood presented as truth (cf. Dem., 8, 13, λόγος καὶ προφάσεις). The term λόγος or *logus*, "fable," was in vogue even until Seneca (Consolatio ad Polybium, 8, 27).

μῦθος, generic in Homer and Hesiod, begins with Pindar to denote the fictitious (cf. Gildersleeve, Comm., Pind., O., 1, 29, Smyth on Simonides, 23, 1). Of Fable strictly, μῦθος is found in classical times only in Pseudo-Plato, Alcib., 1, 123A, κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον, where, however, the figure is all, the story nothing. In Plato, Phaedo, 61B, the phrase μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου refers to the element of invention mentioned by Socrates as the mark of poetry (ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους). Cebes had used the common term, τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους. In Aristophanes, Pax 131, the κόρη calls the λόγος of the Beetle and Eagle of v. 129, ἄπιστον μῦθον. Aristotle (356b, 11) uses μῦθος of an Aesopic creation-story cited to prove its falsity. μῦθος in Plato, Phaedo, 60c, is "allegory." This is all generic, therefore.

The Romans had no suitable word for Fable. *Fabula*, like μῦθος, is too broad. Quintilian always uses *fabella*, except *fabula* once (inst. or., 5, 11, 19) after a preceding *fabella*. Horace's *amiles fabellas* (Sat., 2, 6, 77 f.) may include both. Phaedrus makes a distinction in 4, 7, 22: *si nec fabellae te iuvant nec fabulae*, but the terms are indistinguishable elsewhere in Phaedrus (cf. Ellis, Avianus, p. 65). The term *apologus* is nowhere used distinctly of Fable (cf. Quintil., 6, 3, 44; Cornif., 1, 6, 10). Cicero (de Or., 2, 66, 2, 64) refers to the genus Anecdote, which may not have included Fable. The *apologus* of Ennius (Gell., 2, 29, 20) is a Märchen. Havet's classification of the fables of Phaedrus as *apologi* and *narratiunculae* (p. 254 of his edition) is not satisfactory. The term *apologus* therefore, like our Apologus, is generic not specific. Seneca, as said above, preferred the term *logus*.

The term "Aesopic," as used of Fable, here requires notice. For our purpose, the existence or non-existence of Aesop does

not matter. See Bibliography. The various sorts of fables, also, that bear his name are not distinguishable (A. Hausrath, *Das Problem der Aesop. Fabel*, N. J., 1898, 1, p. 306). Aesop was known as the "story-teller" as early as Herodotus (cf. II, 134). His specialty doubtless was Fable; but soon all manner of stories, jests and, later, riddles came to be fathered upon him. Aristotle attributes to him a momus-story (H. A., 663 b, 2) and a creation-myth (H. A., 356 b, 11), ridiculing his authority in matters of science. So with Aristophanes's story of the Lark and Her Father (Av., 471 ff.). The anecdote of Aesop and the Dog told by Philocleon (Aristoph., Vesp., 1401 ff.) is pure travesty. Nor can we judge the λόγος Συβαριτικός by the pair of anecdotes in Vesp., 1427 ff., 1435 ff. The Aesopus of Alexis, if we had it, might give a truer idea of the Aesopic. In the fragment remaining (Mein., 3, 386) Aesop, as an observing stranger, discusses an Athenian banquet with the sage Solon, who plays the chief rôle. Aesop may appear as a sage also. We see little of jest but rather a eulogy of moderation, and in the manner of the so-called Middle comedy (cf. Kaibel, Pauly-Wissowa, 1, 1470). Phaedrus felt that there was a limit to the Aesopic, 4 Prol. 10 f.; *fabulis quas Aesopias, non Aesopi nomino*; but does not indicate it. Quintilian (inst. or., 1, 9, 2) distinguishes *Aesopi fabellae* from *fabulae nutricularum*. The latter are Märchen. The μῦθος Αἰσώπειος of the later rhetoricians includes mainly Fable but also more, cf. especially the λογικόν or story of human characters (Aphthon., Sp. 2, 21, W. 1, 59).

3. SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF FABLE.

It is clear then from the previous discussion that the ancient terminology would cover a wide and uncertain area, and might include Myth, Apologue, Anecdote and so on. But generic Fable presents too broad a field for a connected literary study. For convenience, therefore, it is necessary to arbitrarily limit the field by a close definition. Fable as herein treated will therefore be defined as follows: a fictitious narrative wherein one or more animals or inanimate objects are partially personified and intro-

duced as speaking, or acting, or both, in typical relationships, either to set forth some principle or to illustrate a set of circumstances. It is only exceptional when human characters are introduced, and these merely serve to typify Might or Wisdom. When animals or inanimate objects are personified, they are denuded of their own qualities and environment and clothed with human qualities or placed in a human environment only in so far as to sharpen the contrast between them as types. And so, conversely, when men are introduced, they are denuded of all human qualities and human environment, except so much as will serve to set forth their typical character.

It will be seen, therefore, that the essence of Fable as thus defined is three-fold: (1) there must be types, personified if necessary, (2) the types must stand in typical relationship, (3) the types must say or do something—there must be action.

To make the Scope of Fable as indicated by these points still clearer, it will be well to compare and contrast Fable with its nearest congeners: Proverb, Märchen, Tier-Epos, Mythos, Riddle, Ballad and Parable.

(1). *Fable and Proverb.* A generic relationship between Proverb and Fable as already intimated is contained in the common terminology, *aĩnos*, *λόγος*, *μῦθος*, but a marked difference is indicated by the term *παροιμία*, applied to Proverb but never to Fable. The point of contact between Proverb and Fable lies in the fact that Proverb frequently employs the same homely imagery and typical relationships as Fable, but even in that case, there is the marked difference that while Fable has the element of action, Proverb never has action. Where the Proverb even by suggestion contains action, it is only by allusion to some fable, and should be termed, strictly-speaking, Fable Allusion and not Proverb. It is altogether likely of course that many proverbs have come originally from fables, and in process of time have become detached, and the fable forgotten; and also that many fables have been made again from such proverbs as well among the people as by the fabulists or school-boys (cf. Crusius on Babrius in Pauly-Wissowa, 2663).

Proverb differs therefore from Fable in its closest point of contact. It differs further in two other respects, (1) in its range, (2) in the color of its literary form. (1) In its range, Proverb covers a very wide area, all the way from the homely or even vulgar concrete animal or utensil proverb to the abstract and sententious γνώμη (cf. Arist., Rhet., 1, 41, Roemer, p. 20). Proverb thus has access to the higher, more impersonal forms of literature from which Fable is debarred, as well as to the lower forms in greater abundance, because of its greater versatility. (2) In color of literary form, the contrast is diametrical. The very elements in Proverb which παροιμία connotes, viz.: pregnant brevity, emphatic antithesis, and a jingle which often corresponds to some metrical form (e. g., ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει, Arist., Rhet., 63, 15 (Roemer), cf. Usener, Altgr. Versbau, p. 46 ff.; Linde, de prov. ap. trag. Gr. usu, pp. 13, 17), these in Proverb are distinctly folk-elements, except where the Proverb may have sprung from literature. But with the Fable, the reverse is the case; wherever these elements are found they do not occur as folk-elements, but as evidences of the conscious artist, adapting the Fable to some particular purpose. One or two illustrations will give point to this distinction. Contrast for example ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα; προφάσεως δέεται ἡ πονηρία; Ἀττικὸς πάροιχος; ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει (Arist., Rhet., 63, 16; 68, 3; 141, 20, 63, 15, Roemer); and in English "wilful waste makes woeful want," where all the elements mentioned are popular, with the following:

μήτε ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι
μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἀρπάζεσθαι

(Xen., Mem., 2, 7, 13);

absentis ranae pullis vituli pede pressis, (Hor., Sat., 2, 3, 314); *ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nec os acciperet datum, nec dentes conficerent* (Livy, 2, 32). The contrast is obvious.

(2). *Fable differs from Märchen, Tier-Epos and Mythus.* Märchen is a naïve story, told, at least primarily, for its own sake. If dramatic characterization is largely introduced, we have Tier-

Epos. Personification and adornment abound, *σεμνὸν ἅμα ἡδονῇ*, Hermogenes, Sp. 2, 290. Märchen goes back to the childhood of the race, to the time when men scarcely distinguished the brutes from themselves. So they are the first stories told to children, *fabulae nutriculorum*, Quint., Inst. or., 1, 9, 2, cf. Plato, Rep., 2, 377B, *μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας*. *μῦθος* here includes Mythos, i. e., Märchen in which gods and heroes as well as inanimate objects figure. But there is a kernel of truth, *ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ*, Rep., 1. c., cf. Carlyle, Heroes and Hero Worship, c. 1. Märchen and Mythos are originally unconscious, and seek even in literature to transfer us to the other world of fancy, "Das Wunschland des Märchens," cf. Crusius, Verhandl. Deutscher Philologen u. Schulmänner, 1890, p. 36. The Fable, however, is always conscious, never told for its own sake, personifies only within limits, and continually suggests the practical world we live in.

(3). *Fable and Riddle*. The alleged relationship between the Fable and the Riddle, as said above, is without warrant. Riddle consists of a number of disconnected metaphors, Jülicher Gleichnisreden Jesu, p. 58 f. Fable is a manner of enlarged simile, Ibid., op. cit., p. 98. The meaning of the Fable lies upon the surface; its aim is to explain. The Riddle has a hidden meaning; it seeks to perplex. Yet the Riddle approaches the Fable in being akin to gnostic literature, cf. Ohlert, op. cit., p. 80. The range of the Riddle, like that of the Proverb, is extensive, and, like the Proverb again, the Riddle enters the loftier literature more readily (cf. Ohlert, op. cit., p. 84 ff.).

(4). *Fable and Ballad*. The link between the Fable and another popular literary form, the Ballad, is found in the fables of scolia. But the Ballad as folk-song goes back to an unconscious age, while scolia are said to have originated with Terpander (Smyth, Melic Poets, xeviii). Convivial poetry, however, is as old as Greek civilization (Ibid., 1. c.). The Fable in scolia illustrates a theme proposed by the *arbiter bibendi* or a banqueter (Ibid., op. cit., c). It may have been improvised, thus far ballad-

like. The usual metre also of the scolia, like that of the folk-songs, was logaoedic. For example Scolion 16 (Bergk) (containing a fable) is Pherecratic-Glyconic (cf. Smyth, *Skol.*, xiv). The popular use of the Fable in songs may have been suggested its use by Archilochus in his *ἐπῶδοι*, cf. *infra*.

(5). *Fable and Parable*. For a full discussion of the relationship from the side of Parable, compare Jülicher, *op. cit.*, 94 ff. Like *παραβολή*, Fable, according to Aristotle (*Rhet.*, 2, 20, 9) is a species of *παράδειγμα*, yet the fictitious or fantastic imagery of the Fable is in marked contrast to the human and real relationships of the Parable (cf. Jülicher, *op. cit.*, p. 101).

Fable therefore, like Parable, is essentially a species of illustration. Horace calls it *imago*, *Sat.*, 2, 3, 320, *Epp.*, 1, 7, 34. It illustrates either a circumstance or a principle or both. The earliest use of Fable must have been as illustration pure and simple without any conscious induction on the part of the hearer. Most men, the more so the more simple-minded, reason from particular to particular (John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, p. 210, note), and it is conceivable also that primitive folk were easily captivated by the, to them, attractive fable imagery, and led unconsciously in the direction in which it pointed (cf. Quintil., *inst. or.*, 5, 11, 19); and in enforcing a general principle, also, to the unlettered an ounce of concrete familiar illustration outweighs a ton of abstract argument. What we have seen we believe (cf. *Ant.*, frg. 34, 35, Blass). The illustration must only be a *propos, ex re* (Hor., *Sat.*, 2, 6, cf. Mathaeus, Walz, 1, 122, Aristoph., *Vesp.*, 1321). The Fable is, therefore, like the Parable, a species of argumentation. As such, the circumstantiality of the Fable and its clearness and readiness of type representation make it a very direct and often unanswerable argument, *ceteris paribus* (cf. Jülicher, *op. cit.*, p. 97 f., and see *infra*, p. 25 f.).

4. THE ORIGIN OF FABLE.

It has been shown hitherto that the Fable has characteristics distinguishing it from all other literary forms, and that the

distinctive elements may be largely gathered up into one word, "typification," or the phrase "analogous reasoning from type illustration." It is in place then to enquire why the reasoning faculty of the Greeks especially and also of the Romans should have hit upon such an easy and forceful method of analogous reasoning.

Fable owes its origin to three things: the love and observation of animal (or plant) life, a highly developed faculty of analogy, and a predilection for the gnomic. These qualities were highly developed in the Greeks, and account both for the multitude of their fables, and the profusion of their Märchen, legends, riddles, concrete proverbs, etc. All of these are alike naïve. And as for Fable, the Moderns, lacking the combination of faculties mentioned, have very largely borrowed from the Ancients, the Greeks especially, whence it comes that the Moderns are prone to view the Fable as an artistic literary form, or to over-accentuate its moral element.

The fondness of the Greeks for animals goes back to the earliest times, and is shown frequently throughout the literature. (The Romans are in a large sense imitators). Very striking is the wonderful fidelity with which animals are represented in the art of the Mycenaean age, cf. Keller, *Fleck. J. Supp.*, iv, 315. This may have had much to do with the flood of transformation poetry, animal-epics and fables in early Greek literature: the first, e. g. in Semonides of Amorgus, frg. 7, Bgk.; the second in the *Batrachomyomachia* (cf. Christ, *Griech. Litt.*, p. 56); the last in Hesiod, op. 203 ff., in Archilochus and in Timocreon, frg. 3, Bgk.; cf. the rise of the Aesopic Fable. Significant later also is the large employment of animal-choruses in the Greek Comedy, e. g., in the *Storks* of Teleclides, the *Fish* of Archippus, the *Frogs*, *Wasps*, *Birds* of Aristophanes, the *Animals* of Crates, the *Ant-men* of Pherecrates, the *Goats* of Eupolis. The last four of these, Zielinski traces to Märchen motifs (*Märchenkomödie*, p. 9 ff., p. 20 ff., p. 28 ff., p. 31 ff.). Cf. also the talking horse of Homer, *Il.*, 19, 404. The same liking for animals appears in the Centaur and Satyr myths and the popular animal superstitions, omens,

etc., frequently reproduced on coins or alluded to in literature (cf., e. g., Freeman, *History of Sicily*, 4, p. 354 f., Hom., *Il.*, 12, 200 ff., Aesch., *Ag.*, 110 ff.).

The actual impress of even the pre-historic Tier-Märchen is seen in the typical characters assigned to animals in Proverb and Fable and frequently elsewhere in the literature. These types are used extensively by Semonides (frg. 7); they are frequent in Comedy and elsewhere, and last as long as the literature. A good example is Lucian's characteristic of the hireling moralists, (*Pisc.* 34): *πρὸς τὸ ἀργύριον κεχήνασιν, ὀργιλώτεροι μὲν τῶν κυνιδίων ὄντες, δειλότεροι δὲ τῶν λαγῶν, κολακευτικώτεροι δὲ τῶν πιθήκων, ἀσελγέστεροι δὲ τῶν ὄνων, ἀρπακτικώτεροι δὲ τῶν γαλῶν, φιλονεικώτεροι δὲ τῶν ἀλεκτρονίων.* Cf. the later rhetoricians on *μῦθος*. In all this typification, also, in Simile or Metaphor, Proverb or Fable, the *märchenhaft* still clings in part to the animal characters.

5. THE FABLE TYPES.

The Sphere of Fable may now be shown more concretely by a tabulation of the type characters which appear in the classical Fable, with some slight notices showing the scope of Fable imagery. These types cover the literature from Hesiod to Livy.

<i>Author.</i>	<i>Work.</i>	<i>Character.</i>	<i>Characteristic.</i>
1. Hesiod,	Op., 203 ff.,	{ Hawk,	Cruelty.
2. Archilochus,	frg. 86, etc.,	{ Nightingale,	Overpowered Gentleness.
		{ Fox,	Fair Play.
		{ Eagle,	Haughty Sovereignty.
	frg. 89,	{ Fox,	Cunning.
		{ Ape,	Pretense.
3. Timocreon,	no. 3,	{ Fox without tail,	Policy.
		{ Foxes with tails,	Policy.
4. Herodotus,	I, 141,	{ Piper,	Power.
		{ Fishes,	Wilfulness.
5. Xenophon,	Mem., 2, 7, 13,	{ Dog,	Oversight.
		{ Sheep,	Industry.
	Vesp., 1446,	{ Beetle,	Weakness.
	Pax, 129,	{ Eagle,	Power.
	Lys., 695,	{ Mice,	Weakness.
6. Aristophanes,	Vesp., 1182,	{ Weasel,	Power.

<i>Author.</i>	<i>Work.</i>	<i>Character.</i>	<i>Characteristic.</i>
	AV., 651,	{ Fox, Eagle,	Cunning. Power.
7. (Plato),	Alcib., 123a,	{ Fox, Sick Lion,	Wisdom. Pretended Weakness.
8. Aristotle,	Rhet., 2, 20,	{ Horse, Stag,	Compromising Weakness. Deadly Enmity.
		{ Fox, Hedgehog, Dog-ticks,	Policy. Kind Suggestion. Hostility.
9. Callimachus,	frg. 93, a and b,	{ Laurel, Olive,	Beauty. Usefulness.
10. Ennius,	frg. 482, B,	{ Piper, Fishes,	Power. Useless Rebellion.
11. Lucilius,	frg. 778 ff.,	{ Fox, Sick Lion,	Craft. Pretended Weakness.
12. Horace,	Sat., 1, 6, 22, Epp., 1, 3, 19,	{ Ass, Lion's Skin, Crow, Birds,	Ignobleness. Nobleness. Plagiarism. Rightful Ownership.

<i>Author.</i>	<i>Work.</i>	<i>Character.</i>	<i>Characteristic.</i>
12. Horace,	Epp., 1, 1, 73-5, Sat., 2, 5, 56, Sat., 2, 1, 75, Sat., 2, 3, 314 ff., Epp., 1, 7, 29 ff., Epp., 2, 3, 139, Epp., 1, 10, 34 ff., Sat., 2, 6, 79, 2, 32,	{ Fox, { Sick Lion, { Fox, { Raven, { Serpent, { File, { Frog, { Calf, { Dormouse, { Weasel, { Mountain, { Mouse, { Horse, { Stag, { City Mouse, { Country Mouse, { Belly, { Members,	Caution. Pretended Weakness. Craft. Vanity. Envy. Uprightness. Emulousness. Power. Gluttony. Cynicism. Greatness. Littleness. Compromising Weakness. Hostility. Aristocracy. Contented Poverty. Aristocracy. Lowly Industry.
13. Livy,			

The foregoing tabulation will show that within the narrow range of the Fable itself there is yet a considerable variety of type coloring. Not only is there variety in the types themselves individually, but in the attitude of the types towards each other and towards their environment, e. g., as to whether they are friendly or hostile, in earnest or in jest, whether the characteristics of the type are accentuated or toned down by their environment, etc. It is because of this possible diversity of tone that the Fable is capable of being used in so many different departments of literature, adapting itself readily to each department.

In regard to the types themselves, three classes may be distinguished as broadly indicative of the general scope: (1) the highly personal, (2) the somewhat personal, and (3) the impersonal. Under the first class come, for example, the Fox, the Ape, the Eagle, the Hawk, the Lion, the Serpent, etc.; under the second, the Piper, the Fishes, the Ass, the Horse, the Mice, the Weasel, etc.; under the third, the Olive, the Laurel, etc. The first group have a personality capable of being highly, offensive or antagonistic. Under such types as these, bitter hatred and cruelty may be set forth, and in a most direct and personal way, The second group have less strength of character, so to speak, and even in antagonism cannot express the same intensity of feeling as those of the first group. They may be even semi-literary in tone. The third group have no suggestion of offensiveness. They are wholly literary in their suggestion.

It may be remarked further that if two types are brought into opposition, both having marked outstanding traits which are antagonistic, then there is a maximum of conflict and so of feeling; for example, when Fox meets Ape or Eagle as in the fables of Archilochus (figs. 86, 89, etc.), where the types are chosen for their invective content. This antithesis of Types, making each Type a manner of foil to the other, is a striking characteristic of Fable generally (cf. Keidel, *Old French Fables*, p. 2). It grew out of the Greek love of antithesis no doubt, and it serves to give a truer and clearer analogy of human life; for the Fable types represent not only human nature and human passion individually, but also represent men as revealing this humanness with reference

to one another. This is why the Fable has the power to lay bare human foibles and human traits and motives of all kinds in so clear and striking a manner.

The detailed study of the fables themselves will abundantly illustrate this point; and it will also be seen how each fable and the department of literature in which it occurs re-act stylistically upon each other, or in other words that each type has *per se* a stylistic content or flavor, which adapts itself appropriately to each author's purpose.

6. THE THEMES OF FABLE.

The table above also indicates the variety of problems or themes treated in the classical fables. The problems are chiefly these: Cruelty, Defenselessness, Haughtiness, Cunning, Hatred, Wilfulness, Industry, Indolence, Compromise, Beauty, Utility, Stubbornness, Ignobleness, Hypocrisy, Caution, Vanity, Envy, Rivalry, Cynicism, Retribution, Insignificance, Luxury, Contentment, Cooperation. Each type or each fable sets forth vividly some one or more of these qualities, and all taken together furnish a considerable range of gnostic teaching or illustration.

7. GENERAL STYLISTIC FEATURES.

Before proceeding to a detailed stylistic study of the Fable in various departments, it will be well, if we may, to establish a literary norm of Fable by which to measure stylistically the various fables treated. We may draw hints from four sources.

(1). *The Rhetoricians.* The ancients themselves give us little in a systematic way touching the style of Fable; although it might be supposed that the Greek rhetoricians especially, who nearly all refer to the subject of Fable, would give us much light on this subject. Such however is not the case. Still they do give us the best direct evidence of any one, but this only broadly, incidentally, as their purpose was pedagogical and not merely stylistic. Yet their stray notices are thoroughly well worth gathering together.

Fable the rhetors prescribe among the earliest studies of the young and for three main reasons: (1) for its ethical value (Walz, 1, p. 9) Τὸν μῦθον πρῶτον ἀξιούσι προσάγειν τοῖς νέοις, διότι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ῥυθμίζειν δύναται· καὶ ἔτι ἀπαλοὺς ὄντας αὐτοὺς ἀξιούσι πλάττειν.

The study of Fable was indeed considered a very practical kind of training in morals, πάντως χρήσιμον πρὸς τι τῶν ἐν βίῳ.

(2). It prepared the mind of the youth for the study of Poetry (Walz, 2, 8, ὡς συγγενεῖα τινὲ χρώμενον πρὸς τὰ ποιήματα) and also for the study of History and Mythology (Walz, 2, 158, 569).

(3). It prepared for the study of Rhetoric. Indeed it was the beginning of that study. These were the main methods of its use in this connection: Given a fable, deduce the moral. Given a moral, make a fable to illustrate it. Confirm or rebut a fable argument. Turn a fable in verse into prose; explain, abbreviate or embellish it. (Cf. Walz, 1, 158). Fables were to be memorized as models of styles. The three departments of Oratory were to be illustrated as occasion required. (Walz, 2, 568). The idea of Eulogy or Condemnation of the characters in Fable led finally, however, to a long drawn out epideictic type of Fable. Many of those given as models in the rhetoricians show this tendency very plainly, e. g., that of the Horse and Stag eulogizing Freedom as typified in the Horse (Walz, 1, 424 ff.); cf. the virtual ψόγος λύκου in Walz, 1, 597 ff., the latter occupying 62 lines!

In this general sort of pedagogical discussion there are, as said, here and there some stylistic hints. These are of considerable value but are all subject to the qualification that μῦθος which refers to Fable, also includes Anecdote (τὸ λογικόν, Walz, 1, 59) or story of human characters, which might properly contain characteristics not belonging to Fable in the strict sense. However, the Scholiast on Aphthonius (Walz, 2, 573) says distinctly that the style must be simple, if there are only animal characters.

The points of style noticed by the Fabulists are these: (1) simplicity (ἀφέλεια). The scholiast on Aphthonius in Walz 2, 567, says that μῦθος is τῶν ἄλλων ἀφελέστερον καὶ ἀπλούστερον. Similar is the dictum of Theon (Walz 1, 175) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μύθοις ἀπλουστέραν τὴν ἐρμηνείαν καὶ προσφυῇ, καὶ ὡς δυνατόν ἀκατά-

σκευόν τε καὶ σαφή. This introduces also (2) clearness, σαφήνεια (σαφή), cf. W. 2, 573 and (3) appropriateness or τὸ πρέπον (προσφυή). Hermogenes emphasizes the latter point (τὸ πρέπον) also as a means to (4) persuasiveness (πιθανότης). He says (Walz 1, 12): ἔτι δὲ καὶ πιθανὸν εἶναι βούλονται. Πῶς δ' ἂν γένοιτο πιθανός; Ἄν τὰ προσήκοντα πράγματα τοῖς προσώποις ἀποδιδῶμεν. A final point (5) natural charm (γλυκύτης) is also mentioned by Hermogenes (Walz 1, 15) τὴν δὲ ἀπαγγελίαν βούλονται περιόδων ἀλλοτρίαν εἶναι γλυκύτητος ἐγγύς. Similarly the scholiast on Aphthonius (Walz 2, 568) says ἐν ᾧ δὲ καθαρᾷ τῇ λέξει χρώμεθα καὶ μετὰ ἀφελείας προάγομεν ἐπαινοῦντες ἅμα, τῆς πανηγυρικῆς ιδέας οὐκ ἀφιστάμεθα, which shows again the whole epideictic tendency as above stated; compare in this regard the style of the orator Isocrates, who in all of the departments of Oratory is everywhere and inevitably epideictic and γλυκὺς. The same poetical coloring of Fable style is shown when it is spoken of as χρηματουργοῦντα καὶ εἰκονίζοντα τὴν ἀλήθειαν, (Walz 2, 568) and as καὶ μετὰ ἡδύτητος ἐθίζων τῆς ὠφελείας ἀντέχεσθαι.

These then are the points of style the Rhetoricians prescribe for μῦθος: Simplicity, Clearness, Appropriateness, Persuasiveness, Charm.

(2). *Quintilian*. The same point of view but with briefer comment is shown in Quintilian's references to the Fable. Besides referring to certain pedagogical methods, he says that a pure, natural, simple style is to be developed in the young by the study and imitation of the style of Fable: *adiiciamus tamen eorum curae quaedam dicendi primordia, quibus aetates nondum rhetorem capientes instituant. Igitur Aesopi fabellas, quae fabulis nutriculae proxime succedunt, narrare sermone puro et nihil se supra modum extollente, deinde gracilitatem stilo exigere condiscant* (inst. or., 1, 9, 12).

Here we have the qualities of καθαρότης (*sermone puro*), ἀφελεία (*nihil se supra modum extollente*), and ἰσχνότης (*gracilitatem*).

As to the subject matter of the Fable, Quintilian says in

another passage (1, 5, 19) that the imaginative element in the simple concrete naïve imagery of the Fable is calculated to appeal to the ignorant and simple-minded. He says: *illae quoque fabellae . . . ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius, quae ficta sunt, audiunt et capti voluptate facile eis, quibus delectantur consentiunt*. Yet Horace, he goes on to say, *ne in poemati quidem humilem generis huius usum putavit*, implying that the Fable could be used in addressing the learned as well as the unlearned. The sphere therefore is primarily that of concrete simplicity which learned and unlearned alike can appreciate. The attitude of Quintilian is more sympathetic than that of his contemporary Livy, who calls the Fable (2, 32) a *priscus et horridus modus dicendi*.

(3). *The Fabulists*. The fabulists make no stylistic comments on Fable, but merely set forth their own departmental aims.

Phaedrus after referring to Aesop as the *auctor* of fables, says, Book 1, Prologus, 1, 3 :

*duplex libelli dos est : quod risum movet
et quod prudenti vitam consilio monet.*

Similar is the introduction to Book 2. In the introduction to Book 3, he says in a general way (v. 29) :

librum exarabo tertium Aesopi stilo.

His aim as a fabulist is stated in v. 49 f. :

*Neque enim notare singulos mens est mihi
verum ipsam vitam et mores hominum ostendere.*

There is nothing definitely stylistic, therefore, in any of this. My stories, says Phaedrus, are simply to be "after the manner of Aesop."

The statement of Babrius is not more definite, intro. 14 ff. :

*μάθοις ἂν οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχοντα καὶ γνοίης
ἐκ τοῦ σοφοῦ γέροντος ἡμῖν Αἰσώπου
μύθους φράσαντος τῆς ἐλευθέρης μούσης.*

ὦν νῦν ἕκαστον, ἣν θέλῃς ἐμῇ μνήμῃ
μελισταγές σοι νῶ τι κηρίον θήσω,
πικρῶν ἰάμβων σκληρὰ κῶλα θηλύνας

(Babrius, p. 10, 14-19)

μελισταγές κηρίον here suggests the element of γλυκύτης.

The aim of Avianus is likewise expressed in general terms. He states, intro., 15 ff., *fabulas dedi, quas rudi latinitate compositas eligis sum explicare conatus. Habes ergo opus quo animum oblectes, ingenium exerceas, sollicitudinem leues, totumque vivendi ordinem cautus agnoscas.* So he says of Horace's use of Fable (l. c., 11 f.) *fabulas poemati suo aptavit, quod in se sub iocorum communium specie vitae argumenta contineant.* This is Avianus's own aim.

The fabulists therefore give very little in the way of stylistic comment; nor is the style of their fables, adapted as it is to a departmental aim, at all such as to be considered a norm of Fable style in general.

(4). *Aristotle.* There is one source however from which we may obtain by deduction at least all the important qualities of normal Fable. Aristotle has made few comments, but has given us two fables. It may even be that this is a case where example is better than precept. At all events, we feel warranted in corroborating or in testing the stylistic notices of the Rhetoricians by the qualities of style the Aristotelian fables exhibit. The fables occur in Rhet., 2, 20. They are: A, that of the Horse and Stag, said to have been spoken by Stesichorus against the tyrant Phalaris (see however Freeman, *History of Sicily*, 2, pp. 66, 150); and B, that of Aesop, spoken in defense of a demagogue, the Fox, Hedgehog and Dog-ticks. These will be discussed in detail as to their purpose and stylistic features.

The setting of fable A is as follows: "When the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris commander-in-chief and were about to give him a body-guard," Stesichorus who opposed this action used the following fable and its application as an ἐπίλογος to his argument:

‘τᾶλλα διαλεχθεῖς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δ’ ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρῆσθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἡρώτα τινὰ ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναται’ ἂν μετ’ αὐτοῦ τιμωρῆσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον, ὁ δ’ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσαντος δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωρῆσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς’, ἔφη, ‘ὄρατε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρῆσασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἤδη, ἐλόμενοι στρατηγόν αὐτοκράτορα· ἐὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δώτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἤδη Φαλάριδι.’

Fable B is introduced as follows :

‘Αἴσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμφῳ δημηγορῶν κρινομένου δημαγωγοῦ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσιν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ κυνорαιστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς, ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον ὡς εἶδεν αὐτήν, κατοικτίραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνорαιστὰς, τὴν δὲ οὐκ εἶναι ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἔλκουσιν αἷμα, ἐὰν δὲ τούτους ἀφέλητε, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιονταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάπτει (πλούσιος γὰρ ἐστίν), ἐὰν δὲ τούτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἕτεροι ἥξουσιν πένητες, οἱ ὑμῖν ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες.’

We may first notice some general points. One of these fables is symboeletic, the other is dicanic, but the style is similar. Both are prudential, advising expediency, hence the tone is similar. The type characters are different, but set forth the same problem of compromise. Both have the native flavor of the out-of-doors, of the world of nature. Both have the application of the fable made to the accompanying circumstances. Both fables are complete and so should contain all the essential elements of normal Fable.

More specifically, the qualities of style which appear in these fables are these :

1. *Simplicity* (ἀφέλεια). This has been hinted at above. It is the most significant trait of Fable. These two are the simplest of all our fables, and probably afford the simplest examples of style in all the ancient literature. The ἀφέλεια is shown (1) in the General Structure. The εἰρομένη λέξις spoken of by Aristotle as characteristic of all early Greek (Rhet., 3, 8) is nowhere in Greek literature better illustrated either in Homer or later in the New Testament. This is shown in many ways. In B there is striking parataxis: οὐ δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολλὸν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν (sc. τὴν ἀλώπεκα), καὶ κυνοραῖστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς. The same abrupt change of subject is shown in the genitive absolute in A: συνομολογήσαντος (sc. τοῦ ἵππου) καὶ ἀναβάντος (sc. τοῦ ἀνδρός). The other genitives absolute, ἐλθόντος καὶ ἀναβάντος, in A, ἐρομένου, in B with subject omitted, are likewise characteristic of the εἰρομένη λέξις. They are of the simple conversational type. Cf. Spieker, Am. Journ. Phil., vi, 340 ff. Similarly "unjointed" is the asyndetic pair of participles in B, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες. This is characteristically unconventional. Contrast the same idea as expressed by Plutarch in telling this Fable (an seni. resp., c. 12) ἂν γὰρ τούτους, ἔφη, μεστοὺς ἀπαλλάξῃς, ἕτεροι προσίασσι πεινῶντες. And with the εἰρομένη λέξις of our fable in general, contrast the periodic style of the context, e. g., in the phrase preceding A: ἐλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν, and in the application of A, ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι, τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ. Aristotle himself does not like the strung-on style because we never see the outcome, as we do with a periodic style (Rhet., 2, 9, Roemer, 195). Instead of this looseness of arrangement the periodic structure came to be cultivated in all literature, but for this reason the avoidance of all rhetorical τάξις in our fable is the more noticeable. It would seem that Aristotle was endeavoring to give an antique flavor to his ancient fables.

(2). In the Word-order. The almost invariable order of words: subject—verb—object, with adjuncts in similar succession, is in keeping with what has been said. This order thus maintained is hard to parallel anywhere else in Greek. We are pleased to call

it in English the logical or natural order, but in Greek it is seldom found the rule for two lines together. Here the exceptions, all in B, are plainly for rugged emphasis; *μον πλήρεις εἰσί, ὀλίγον ἔλκουσιν αἷμα, τούτους ἀφέλῃτε*.

The context shows a sharp contrast in the matter of order, e. g., *ὄρᾱτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι, τὸ αὐτὸ πάθῃτε τῷ ἵππῳ*, applying A; *οἱ ὑμῖν ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες*, applying B. The fable of Herodotus (I, 141) alone of the extant fables approximates in this particular the style of A and B. This fact corroborates the thesis that such an order of words is intentionally naïve. See *infra*.

(3). In Diction. The simplicity of diction is also very noticeable. The whole number of words is nearly altogether made up of nouns, pronouns, verbs and prepositions, all of which are simple. All the adjectives used denote only quantity. There are no rhetorical particles whatever, *μέν* and *δέ* denoting only a loose antithesis. The first two points for which Dionysius commends the style of Lysias are therefore to be found here (de Lys., c. 2, 3): there is the utmost purity of language, and figures of speech are altogether absent.

(4). In non-avoidance of Repetition. Repetition is not avoided as in all rhetorical passages, where variety is constantly sought. This is a mark of the naïve also. For example *τιμωρήσασθαι* occurs three times in A. It has been noticed above also that two participles are used together, where a more polished style would have varied one by a verb. As a naïve quality of early Epic, this characteristic of repetition is too common to need illustration. Like the other marks of *ἀφέλεια* we may safely say therefore that this element is also consciously naïve.

2. *Ruggedness* (*τραχύτης*). Aristotle (l. c.) in commenting on the *εἰρομένη λέξις* in general says it is not *ἡδύς*, because of lack of balance. When in addition there is also a total neglect of euphonious grouping of words within a colon, plainly the effect is one of *τραχύτης*. For example, *ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος* would be smoother if arranged *μόνος κατεῖχεν ἵππος λειμῶνα*. So with *βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον* as compared with *βουλόμενος τὸν ἔλαφον τιμωρήσασθαι*. So with *ἔχων ἀκόντια* as

compared with ἀκόντια ἔχων and many other phrases in A and B, e. g., ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες. This τραχύτης therefore violates χάρις or γλυκύτης. The quality τραχύτης indeed is declared the opposite of γλυκύτης in Walz 3, 645, and is one of the marked differences between the normal Fable as told by Aristotle and the Fable in the fabulists and rhetoricians, as characterized above.

Word-order constitutes an important chapter of literary esthetics, and word-order has to do with rhythm. Now rhythm depends not merely upon the proportion of musical sounds in individual syllables or in individual words, but it depends to a large extent also upon the melodious arrangement of words in a colon, as well as of cola in a paragraph. Where thought dominates form too much, we have the style of a philosopher or a scientist, where form dominates thought we have the style of a man of letters; and the domination of the one or the other is indicated in a large degree by the mere arrangement of words in each case. In the translating of Greek into English, it is a favorite dictum that we must render the Greek as far as possible in the exact order in which it is written, since this is the logical order, the order in which the ideas should properly be presented. But in polished literature, there is a law which dominates that of mere logical order, as it dominates rules of grammatical formation, or even of syntax (e. g., in the case of inverse and Attic attraction): that is, the law of rhythm. This is in no language more true than in Greek, the most rhythmical of all languages. Hence arise many of the ornamental figures of speech, which doubtless play their part in the enforcement of thought as well, but which are none the less esthetic for all that. Examples are παρίσωσις, ἀντίθεσις, παρομοίωσις, παρήχησις, and many others. These have to do with the selecting of words similar in sound, or similar or opposite in meaning, or their arrangement by cola so as to produce a rhythmical effect. When this arrangement is carried to an extreme we have the style of a Gorgias: when it is according to the maximum of taste, we have the style of an Isocrates, who polishes up a dicanic speech, such as the Αἰγυνητικός in a panegyric style, even avoiding hiatus. (Cf. on

the whole subject Aristotle, *Rhet.*, c. 9 ; Blass, *Die Rhythmen der attischen Kunstprosa* ; Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*).

Enough has been said to indicate that the qualities of esthetic arrangement of words are almost entirely neglected in Fables A and B, no respect being had to forming cola which are melodious in any way ; and while the construction is inevitable so that no punctuation would ever have been needed, the effect is distinctly one of unpolished *πραχύτης*. By contrast, it will be noted in the discussion of other fables, how all the rhythmical elements mentioned above are utilized. These however are, as stated, plainly absent in the norm before us.

3. *Clearness* (*σαφήνεια*). Although there is no characterization, the type characters play their parts so clearly that there is no need of any stage directions, so to speak. Horse and Stag, Fox, Hedgehog and Dog-ticks stand in undoubted relations to one another. So much so that the person readily changes without formal indication, *συνομολογήσαντος καὶ ἀναβάντος* in A referring to two different individuals, the subject changing again in *αὐτὸς ἐδόλευσε*. Cf. the clearness of Homer in a similar change of subject, *Od.*, 10, 328.

Aristotle says (l. c.) that one is apt to be lost in the maze of the *εἰρομένη λέξις*. But while this is true in general, it is not true here, for no amount of periodic structure would enable the characters to perform their parts any more clearly than they do, because the antithesis of type with each type acting out its part naturally (*τὸ πρέπον*) does what periodic emphasis and antithesis generally do towards clearness.

The clearness is due in a large measure also to the vividness of action in the large number of verbs and participles (forty-five in all), as against seventeen nouns, these also being all concrete except *χρόνον*. Hence the nouns as well as the verbs are descriptive. Besides there are no complexes of any kind. Again the whole scene in each fable is clear as well as simple to the point of circumstantiality. The *ὀρθότης* too of A no doubt enhances its clearness somewhat. This is a common characteristic of Fable (cf. Gildersleeve, *Am. Journ. of Phil.*, ix, 141).

It is the way in which a child writes a letter. This clearness and directness makes possible the considerable element of *ἐνάργεια*, especially in B where there is grim humor in the choice of the two evils. "Better to be eaten by dog-ticks already full than by new and hungry ones." "Better stay in the frying-pan than leap into the fire." Other elements of *ἐνάργεια* are noticed below under 6.

4. *Brevity* (συντομία). Nothing could be briefer than these fables. Not a single word could be dispensed with. Contrast fable A as told in Hermogenes (Walz 1, 424f.), occupying forty-one lines. Yet there is no ellipsis in our fables, and no abruptness. As already indicated the brevity is made possible by the use of types fully known beforehand and therefore needing no elaborate description. Horace's commendation of the style of Homer in the *Odyssey* applies here with full force (Epp. 2, 3, 148 f.):

*Semper ad eventum festinat et in medias res
Non secus ac notas auditorem rapit.*

Fable is oratorical and not historical narrative, and therefore should be compact. Brevity combined with clearness also makes a strong combination in oratory. Dionysius de Lys., c. 4.

5. *Persuasiveness* (πιθανότης). Aristotle says that a *παράδειγμα* is best used to clinch a previous argument and that even a single illustration is very effective in an *ἐπίλογος*. Fable A was undoubtedly (τὰλλα διαλεχθείς), and B possibly so used. But the fable in each case also forms the basis of induction, *ἐπαγωγή*, for the application or argument which is deduced therefrom, *ἐνθύμημα*. Hence the fables here are doubly *πιθανός*. The circumstantiality also of Fables in general and their fixity of type relationship make the conclusion clearly inescapable, granting only two things: (1) that the fable leads only to one possible course of action, and (2) the trueness of the illustration as a whole. The *πιθανότης* of any given fable should however not be judged so much by its appropriateness as by the inherent inevitableness of the illustration itself. Given the appropriate

setting therefore and the singleness of possibilities, the *πιθανότης* of a fable is plainly inevitable, merely because the fable relations are based by clear analogy upon the fundamental laws of human nature which are invariable. The fable of the Lions and Hares, says Aristotle (*Polit.*, 3, 13), would be unanswerable in the mouth of the Oligarchs. In many fables, however, as in both A and B, the question raised is that of a choice between two possible courses, each in itself undesirable; hence the *πιθανότης* of these fables depends entirely upon circumstances; there were two horns still to the dilemma. As a matter of fact the political efforts of Stesichorus we know were unavailing. Cf. Christ, *Griech. Litt.*, p. 163. As to the outcome in the other case we know nothing.

The *πιθανότης* of these fables will be clearer from the consideration of the general value of Fable as argument. Aristotle says that argument from history is better than argument from Fable, because history is likely to repeat itself. Yet before history had been made the Fable doubtless played a prominent rôle in oratory, for as Quintilian says (1, 5, 19) *simplicius, quae ficta sunt, audiunt* (sc. *rustici et imperiti*). This is supported from other fables in oratory. The whole argument of Menenius Agrippa before the Plebs (*Livy*, 2, 32) seems to have consisted of the fable of the Belly and Members and its application, and that of Aesop in B may have been so confined. There are two other fables that we know of in early oratory, that of Philistus (*F. H. G.*, Mueller, frg. 16; 1, 187) not extant, and the one in Herodotus.

The Attic orators do not use Fable (Volkmann, *Rhet.*, p. 237) yet we must suppose from Aristotle's citations that they were admissible in his day. No doubt the formal orators, just like Aristophanes and later *Livy* (2, 32) deemed the Fable a *priscus et horridus modus dicendi*. But the common people still used fables to win a jury with a laugh (*Aristoph.*, *Vesp.*, 566), while Demosthenes and Demades found a readier ear for fable-like anecdotes than for matters of moment (*Plutarch*, *vit. dec. orat.*, p. 401, Demades, frg. 232, B. & S., p. 317. So Cornificius commends anecdote in *Insinuatio*, cf. Volkmann, p. 437).

One other remark in this connection. The whole aim of sym-

bouleutic and dicanic oratory is to persuade, but the initial steps to persuasion are the winning of favor, and the statement of principles involved, supported of course by facts (cf. Demosthenes, 54, 2). These two initial points are strong in Fable from its imagery and gnostic content, and hence tend to *πιθανότης*. The Fable, in short, when complete and accompanied by its application is thus a miniature of an ideal oration and hence may constitute a whole address in itself, as we have seen.

6. *Dramatic Elements* (*ἐνάργεια*), (a) *ἡθοποιία*. As already indicated, *ἦθος* and *τὸ πρέπον* combine to make the whole scene in both A and B highly impressive. The near background of nature, and the bold personification of animal characters contribute a certain *χάρis* and *γλυκύτης* such as are amplified very much by artificial embellishment in the fable of Hermogenes (l. c.).

The *ἦθος* of Fable saves the dignity of the speaker, especially if a man of rank, for he is enabled to speak out his own feelings somewhat impersonally through the Fable characters.

(b) *πάθος*. Fable A illustrates the three points of the Aristotelian definition of the ideal drama (cf. *Poetics*, c. 13): (1) The hero the Horse is well known and (2) beginning with prosperity he ends in adversity. (3) The third element of unconscious transgression may also be seen in the persistent attempt to get rightful revenge, which however only leads to servitude. The three characters are Horse, Stag and Man. (1) The Horse was a prime favorite among the Greeks. Xerxes, says Herodotus, came against the Greeks with his host like a 'horse with trappings.' Achilles is compared to a prize horse, *Il.*, 22, 22; cf. also *Il.*, 6, 506 ff., Simon., 7, 57, Aelian H. A., 210. This figure would especially appeal in Sicily, the home of the thoroughbred (cf. Freeman, 1, p. 94), and there is no mean compliment to the Sicilians and to their fertile country therefore in the setting, *ἵππος κατείχε λειμῶνα*. Indeed the Horse was too noble, Aristotle would say, awakening too much *πάθος* and *ἔλεος* in the spectator or listener (cf. *Poetics*, l. c.). This whole point of *ἦθος*, *πάθος* and *ἐνάργεια* is well stated in *Rhetores Graeci*, Spengel, 1, 317, *κινεῖ δὲ ἔλεον ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐνάργεια ἡ τῶν ἀτυχούντων καὶ ἡθοποιία καὶ χαρακτηρισμὸς ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν γινόμενος*. (2) The

Stag on the other hand was a proverb of heartless cruelty (cf. the version of this fable in Walz 1, 425, cf. also Nicholas, W. 1, 350). (3) The other character is human. Now whenever a human character is introduced as here, and especially with human weapons, and the human implement, a *χαλινός*, the Fable is more conscious and therefore less naïve. The whole action of the Fable is therefore on a high dramatic plane. And this is quite in keeping, for the poet Stesichorus would naturally choose dignified imagery. So it is quite significant also that this fable finds its way into the highest range of Horatian Satire, Epp., 1, 10, 34 ff., and that it is developed as a model of *γλυκύτης* by Hermogenes (l. c.). We cannot prove whether Stesichorus used this fable in verse or not.

Fable B on the other hand while quite as realistic is very much more homely and naïve in its characters and setting. The Fox, admirable only when successful, and then only as a Spartan thief is admirable; the Hedgehog slow-witted but very practical although of limited range (cf. the Proverb *ἐν μέγα*); and the Dog-ticks aggressive but devoid of other characteristics; these are homely enough. Then the action is homely. A Fox fording a swollen stream seeks refuge, half-drowned, in a cave, until the Dog-ticks find him out. In this plight the Hedgehog comes along and kindly proffers his services in removing the Dog-ticks, only to be met with the rejoinder, "let bad enough alone, it might be worse." This is all very homely, and yet truly human, as is abundantly illustrated at every election. The homeliness is in part atoned for by the indirection of *oratio obliqua*, making the story somewhat prettier. So much then for characterization. The *ἦθος* is clear, but on the whole, the *πάθος* is mild.

We have established the qualities therefore of Simplicity, Ruggedness, Clearness, Brevity, Persuasiveness and Liveliness. Such then are the qualities of the fables narrated by Aristotle, and these fables are narrated moreover in such a manner no doubt as to illustrate what Aristotle himself might lay down as the characteristics of Fable, at least in Prose. As for Poetry, these characteristics may easily be supplemented by inference from the poetical fables themselves, which may now be studied from the Aristotelian point of view, as it were.

II. THE FABLE IN THE CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE.

1. EPIC. HESIOD.

The historical study of the Fable in classical literature must of course begin with homely Hesiod and his fable of the Hawk and Nightingale (Op., 203 ff.). We have here then the fact that Fable appears first in literature in poetic form.

The suitability of the poetic form to the Fable is evidenced by its use in many authors as shown above, p. 11 f., and by the further fact that at least three writers, Phaedrus, Babrius and Avianus, made Poetic Fable a department by itself. The qualities illustrated in the Aristotelian Fables are indeed in the main the very qualities which would be in place in poetry, especially, ἀφέλεια, σαφήνεια, συντομία, and ἐνάργεια. The quality τραχύτης must of course be excluded. The quality πιθανότης postulates but one limitation, viz., that the poetry be in some sense didactic. As to metre, that must be such as will be suited to dialogue. In other respects the color of the Fable in each case will depend merely upon the characters and scene and upon the general tone of each department.

In fact some of the Fable qualities are more characteristic of Poetry than of Prose. Because of the limitations of verse, the style must of necessity not be characterized by complexes of thought or expression; the λέξις, that is, is more likely to be of the εἰρομένη type. Besides Poetry appeals more to heart and less to head than Prose, hence diction, construction and rhetorical form are all likely to be simple and more direct. Poetry also deals more with the fanciful than Prose, and this is very suitable to the fantastic imagery of Fable. Hence the rhetors thought Fable a good study to prepare for the study of Poetry. As to metre, the Fable passes readily into those forms which are nearest to Prose, the poetical form meanwhile re-enforcing the element of

fancy just referred to. We are not surprised therefore that nearly all the classical fables are in verse of some sort.

Indeed it is not improbable at all that the first fables were in verse form, like many other kinds of popular literature. Verse would be a natural form for didactic poetry especially, for didactic poetry must be *εὐμαθής*, and the very sound of the verse would help to impress the thought on the memory (cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.*, p. 195, Roemer). Doubtless too in early times when men like children did not very consciously differentiate animals and even inanimate things from themselves, the Tier-Epos or the Fable might celebrate the Fox or Lion in verse with great éclat before a ready audience. The Germans from their own literary history have theorized very successfully along this line (cf. e. g., Grimm, Reinhart Fuchs, c. 1, entitled *Wesen der Thierfabel*). Indeed the Germans have handled the whole subject of Fable in a very sympathetic manner.

Be the original form of Fable what it may, at all events it was a poet, Hesiod, who first introduced Fable into Greek literature. Not only, moreover, did Hesiod adopt the Fable itself, but he has given to the Fable most unmistakably the quality of the department. Hence his fable, although there is but one, may be taken as a stylistic test of Hesiod's didactic epic in general.

The fable is given below. Its style will be examined from the point of view of the qualities enumerated as normal, and then the departmental aim in the use of the fable will be shown.

Before quoting the fable, it is very important to give its immediate setting before dealing with the larger question of the poem as a whole. See *infra*, p. 31. Hesiod has just been setting forth the various ages of the human race, the golden age (v. 109 ff.), the silver age (v. 127 ff.), the bronze age (v. 143 ff.), the heroic age (v. 156 ff.), and the present or iron age (v. 174 ff.). These are characterized in turn, the last being the worst. This latter age is marked by greed of gain that toils day and night, by bitter strife among relatives and friends, by mistreatment of old age, by violation of every duty and every right. The evil and unjust man flourishes; jealousy and cruelty prevail; *Αἰδώς* and *Νέμεσις* have left the earth; there is no recourse against evil. The whole

picture is like that in the biblical account of the "consummation of the age" (Matt. 13 : 39). Cf. Mark 13 : 12, "and brother shall deliver up brother to death, and the father his child ; and children shall rise up against parents, and cause them to be put to death;" 2 Tim. 3 : 1-4, "But know this, that in the last days grievous times shall come. For men shall be lovers of self, lovers of money, boastful, haughty, railers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection, implacable, slanderers, without self-control, fierce, not lovers of good, traitors, head-strong, puffed up, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God." It is in illustration of similar conditions that the fable of Hesiod is introduced. It illustrates especially vv. 200 f.: Τὰ δὲ λείφεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι κακοῦ οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή. The Fable then follows :

202. [Νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς.]
 ὦδ' ἴρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον,
 ὕψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς·
 ἦ δ' ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσι,
 μύρετο· τήν δ' ὄγ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπε·
 Δαιμονίη, τί λέληκας ; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·
 τῇδ' εἰς ἣ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω, καὶ ἀοιδὸν εὐδυσαν·
 δεῖπνον δ', αἶ κ' ἐθέλω, ποιήσομαι ἡὲ μεθήσω.
 ἄφρων δ' ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃ πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν,
 νίκης τε στέρεται πρὸς τ' αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει.
 'Ὡς ἔφατ' ὠκυτέτης ἴρηξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.

The theme in general then is one of serious prophetic warning. It has the lofty grandeur of the prophetic, the poet being lost in the seer, and so the style must be in keeping. We may now look at the qualities of style in this fable as before.

(1). ἀφέλεια. After reading the fables of Aristotle and then reading this one, the difference in this regard is marked. Still in spite of the loftiness of theme, there are several elements of simplicity : (a) the *εἰρομένη λέξις* ; (b) ease of translation ; (c) the diction, which we may note at length. Out of sixty-eight words (not counting those wholly elided) there are twenty words, or

29 %, which are virtually monosyllables. There are also sixteen of two syllables, or 22 %. These short words are emphatically grouped together in v. 208, τῇδ' εἰς ἣ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω, showing angry excitement.

To be sure there are long words also, which are grouped together rather than distributed, e. g., v. 203 f., προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον, νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς, and v. 212, ὠκυπέτης ἵρηξ, ταυνοσίπτερος ὄρνις. But this is rather due to a naïve lack of variety than to a striving after rhetorical effect. This heavier style is often found in Hesiod, who wishes to be moral teacher more than a poet, and does not avoid heaviness to that end, e. g., v. 195 f.,

ζῆλος δ' ἀνθρώποισιν οἰζυροῖσιν ἅπασιν
δυσκέλαδος, κακόχαρτος ὁμαρτήσσει, στυγερώπης.

(2). In regard to τραχύτης. In general it would be contradictory to speak of poetry as τραχύς. This element appears only in parts of lines where there are rough combinations of letters, as ἵρηξ προς—in v. 203; ἐλεὼν γναμπτοῖσι in v. 205; τὴν δ' ὄγ ἐπικρατέως in v. 206; and the excited broken line τῇδ' εἰς ἣ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω in v. 208.

Rather is there frequent illustration of the opposite quality, γλυκύτης. Hesiod does not, to be sure, in the same degree as Homer combine τὸ σεμνόν with ἡδονή (Dionysius de Dem., c. 41), yet he belongs to the γλαφυρός type. (Ibid., c. 40). This is γλυκύς. The γλυκύτης is shown:

(a) In the *Metre*, generally regular and smooth. The Epic hexameter is styled σεμνός by Aristotle (Rhet., 2, 9). Aristotle also says its rhythm is remote from the rhythm of common speech natural to Fable: τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῶος σεμνός, ἀλλὰ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος.

(b) In the general *Melody*. Melody is determined (a) by general smoothness and (β) by the proportion of musical vowels and consonants in the whole. The general blending here is good, as is also the euphony in detail.

(c) In the *Diction*. All poetry takes its color not only from metre, syntax and imagery, but quite as much from the poetical

diction itself, which besides having the atmosphere of poetry, has also its melody and often its unique fancifulness. We cannot of course in detail differentiate the Epic diction from the spoken language of the time, but we may note as certainly poetical the *epitheta ornantia* ποικιλόδειρον (v. 203), ὠκυπέτης, ταυσιπτερος (v. 212) and the following words as apparently strictly poetical: ὕψι, νέφος, μάρπτω (v. 204), ἐλεόν, πείρω (v. 204), μύρομαι, ἐπικρατέω (v. 206), ἀντιφερίζειν (v. 210). To this we may add the poetical Syntax and the Epic set phrases which have the same γλυκὺς effect as poetical diction:

Poetical construction is seen in:

v. 203, ἀηδόνα, P. terminal acc. for dat., cf. τήν, v. 206.

v. 204, ὀνύχεσσι, P. locative. The set phrases are: ὡς ἔφατ', πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπε, πολλὸν ἀρείων.

The definite article is of course altogether absent.

These elements are σεμνός and hence γλυκὺς.

(d) In the Sententious Arrangement. The metre would of course make the straight-on Aristotelian order impossible, but quite apart from this, there is conscious balancing here. Nearly every line shows emphatic or balanced arrangement. The words emphatically placed are the following: ὕψι . . . μεμαρπώς (v. 204), ἐλεὼν γναμπτοῖσι (v. 205), μύρετο (v. 206), ἀρείων (v. 207), τῇδ' (v. 208), δείπνον (v. 209), ἄφρων (v. 210), νίκης (v. 211). As to figures of balance, there is παρήχησις in νεφέεσι . . . ὀνύχεσσι, νεφέεσι φέρων (v. 204), γναμπτοῖσι . . . ὀνύχεσσι (v. 205), and παρονομασία in τῇδ, . . . ἦ, ἐγὼ . . . ἄγω (v. 208). There is rhetorical suspension of idea in ὕψι . . . μεμαρπώς (v. 204), ἐλεὼν . . . μύρετο (vv. 205, 206), δείπνον . . . ποιήσομαι (v. 209); and strong antithesis in ἄφρων . . . ἀντιφερίζειν (v. 210), and in νίκης τε στέρεται πρὸς τ' αἰσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει (v. 211).

The special effect of all these figures will be noticed below under ἐνάργεια. Their total γλυκύτης greatly impressed the late rhetors, who admired the passage and gave it as a model (Walz 1, 175).

Hesiod was therefore not content to be σεμνός. His style

rightly belongs, as Dionysius says (de Dem., c. 40) to the < ἄρμονία > γλαφυρὰ καὶ θεατρικὴ καὶ τὸ κόμψον αἰρουμένη πρὸ τοῦ σεμνοῦ.

(3). *σαφήνεια*. Nothing need be said to show that both the scene and the action are eminently clear. Even the descriptive epithets are not vaguely generic.

(4). *συντομία*. There is a maximum of this quality. It is highly sententious.

(5). *ἐνάργεια*. (a) *ἦθος*. The types are birds, and the *ἦθος* of each is clear and distinctive. So much so as to give a very definite color of fancifulness to the whole scene. Birds appeal more to fancy than beasts because they inhabit both earth and air. Their plumage also has great beauty and variety, and the notes of many are highly musical. Their movements too exhibit remarkable grace and dexterity. There is also an element of secrecy about their doings which added to the other qualities mentioned make them constant objects of our wonderment, curiosity and admiration. Vocal nature appealed to the Greeks however on the side of fancy rather than of emotion (cf. Keller, *Tiere des class. Altertums*, p. 305). It was for this reason that an extravaganza like the *Birds* of Aristophanes was so popular. Yet in our Fable there is both fancy and emotion (on the latter, see below under *πάθος*).

As to the types here used, the Hawk is a typically cruel Bird of Prey (D. W. Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, 65 ff.). Cf. the fable (v. 206, *δεῖπνον ποιήσομαι*). The Nightingale on the other hand is the Bird of Song. Cf. *αἰδόν* (v. 208), Keller, *op. cit.*, 304 ff., Thompson, p. 12 ff. In early times it also typified Poetry (cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 10, 620). As the associate of Apollo, the God of Song, the Nightingale was under Apollo's protection (cf. Keller, p. 311, Aristophanes, *Aves*, 209–221). It was also the emblem of love and trust (Keller, p. 314 ff., Aristophanes, *Aves*, 695 ff.). It was caged but never eaten by the Greeks

(Keller, p. 308). As the messenger of Spring the lyric poets strove in praise of the Nightingale (Keller, p. 309 f.). This links our fable with the Lyric. The Philomela-Procne legend makes a link with Tragedy. On the Story of Procne and Philomela, cf. D. W. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 13 f.

The relationship of the two types in the fable is therefore clearly intended to be highly revolting. This is borne out still further by the *ἡθοποιία*. The Hawk is cruel: (*ἐπικρατέως, δείπνον ποιήσομαι*); it is powerful (*ὠκυπέτης, ταυυσίπτερος*), as it soars aloft with its quarry fast in its talons (*μεμαρπώς*, v. 204); the Nightingale, although a beautiful songster (*ποικιλόδειρον, ἀοιδόν*), can only moan piteously. Such is the general *ἦθος*, but this *ἦθος* is so developed in the personification and general scene that we have also high *πάθος* which we may treat further under that head.

(b) *πάθος*. This is seen vividly in the delineation of each character; aided of course by rhetorical devices.

The Types. The Nightingale is the foil character. Though gentle and gifted (*ποικιλόδειρον*, cf. Euripides, *Hel.*, 1107-12), she is placed in a position beyond all hope of rescue, *ὑψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς*, where either end of the line is a wall of her movable prison. She is in a most cruel plight. Cf. *ἐλεόν* (v. 205), the motif of the fable, emphasized by metrical position; cf. also *ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς*, the figure being made stronger by the more vivid iteration *γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσι* (v. 205), and the emphatic *μύρετο*, beginning v. 206. After this the Nightingale is a passive sufferer in utter despair.

The character of the Hawk is dominant from the first. This character is developed with great pains by the poet, for the whole force of his argument depends chiefly upon the blackness of the picture he is able to paint of the Hawk. The qualities of the Hawk are: (a) Cruelty. Even in the very beginning of the first line, there is a dread omen of cruelty in the words *ὦδ' ἴρηξ*, the position metrically prolonging and emphasizing the rough word *ἴρηξ*, made rough by the sound of *ξ* before *προσείπεν*. This

tendency of cruelty is unchecked by any limitation. The scene is far removed from interference. Cf. ὕψι μάλ', describing the scene, which is metrically emphatic and is re-enforced by the descriptive perfect, μεμαρπώς. In his cruelty the Hawk is harsh (ἐπικρατέως) and bitterly sarcastic (Δαιμονίη, λέληκας), the one word also personifying, the other tearing off the personification, while the perfect λέληκας likewise shows impatient irritation and the complete absence of pity.

(β) Haughty self-assertion: ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων (v. 207). This assertiveness is quite unnecessary, and an evidence, as always, of littleness of soul. It is prolonged in v. 208, τῇδ' εἰς ἣ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω, and in v. 209 δέϊπνον δ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλω ποιήσομαι (δέϊπνον being metrically made prominent), which is followed by the mocking ἄφρων δ' ὅς κ' ἐθέλη of the following line. With this self-assertiveness in an evil course, compare Iliad, 1, 26-32, where Agamemnon abuses the priest of Apollo in terms which show selfish indulgence, injustice, irreverence, disrespect of age, stubbornness, haughtiness and disloyalty:

μή σε, γέρον, κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχείω
 ἢ νῦν δηθύνοντ' ἢ ὕστερον αὖτις ἰόντα,
 μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο.
 τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρὶν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν
 ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ ἐν Ἄργει, τηλόθι πάτρης,
 ἰστὸν ἐποιχομένην καὶ ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιάουσιν.

Compare the assertive ἐγὼ . . . κιχείω with ἐγὼ . . . ἄγω in our fable, the hissing sigmas in μή σε, γέρον, κτλ, defying the priest and μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο, defying the very god, with the hissing defiance of τῇδ' εἰς ἣ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ' ἄγω in our fable, re-enforced by paranomasia and parechesis. This broken line also illustrates the angry use of short, sharp Saxon, as it were, (cf. the monosyllabic tendency in profanity). Each word is a quick stab, followed by another and another. Cf. the line in Iliad, 1, 29, τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω, πρὶν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν. Similarly the priest Chryses in mingled anger and grief counts his beads, as it were, in monosyllables and dissyllables (Il., 1, 40), ἢ εἰ δὴ ποτέ τοι κατὰ πτόνα μηρί' ἔκηα.

(γ) Conscious injustice. The Hawk realizes the innocence of the Nightingale, *καὶ αἰδοῦν ἐοῦσαν*, but his cruelty is so blatant that he glories in it. He delights therefore to add insult to injury. Cf. *ἄφρων*, (spondaic); *ἐθέλῃ*, a sarcastic repetition of his own *αἶ κ' ἐθέλω*; *κρείσσονας*, an echo of *πολλὸν ἀρείων* (v. 207); and the rough threatening *ἀντιφερίζειν*, very suitable to the angry character (Aristotle, *Rhet.*). The Hawk would have the Nightingale take the attitude of Ismene (Sophocles, *Antigone*, v. 63), *ἐκ κρείσσόνων ἀρχόμεσθα*, and be an utterly silent sufferer. It is characteristic of conscious injustice to resent intolerantly the slightest protest, for this stirs the slight remnant of conscience in the oppressor. The final taunt is characteristic: *νίκης τε στερεται πρὸς τ' αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεια πάσχει*, where *νίκης* is both initial and spondaic; *τε* emphatic; *αἴσχεσι . . . ἄλγεια* shows alliterative piling up of Pelion upon Ossa, insult upon injury, defiance upon cruelty. All the cruelty is gloated over and justified by the simple dictum, "might is right." Few and simple are the laws of cruelty. Thus spake the mighty, confident and cruel one, described doubly by two long epithets, *ὠκυπέτης, τανυσίπτερος*. The picture is so dark that we might quote again the rhetor's apt comment as to the effectiveness of such a delineation (Sp., 1, 317): *κινεῖ δὲ ἔλεον ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐνάργεια ἢ τῶν ἀτυχούντων καὶ χαρακτηρισμὸς ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν γινόμενος*.

(6). *πιθανότης*. It is sufficiently clear from what has been said that the *πιθανότης* of this fable *per se* is absolute, for the argument is unanswerable. It now remains but to show how the warp of style, motif and delineation is interwoven with the woof of the poet's departmental aim. This leads to a general consideration of

(7). *The specific purpose of the fable*. We must first consider the poet's general aim in the *Works and Days*. Since there has been a long debate concerning the unity of the poem, (cf. Kirchhoff's *Mahnlieder an Perses*, answered by Peppmueller in *Neue Jahrbücher*, 1890, p. 644 ff., and Ludwig in *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift*, 1890, p. 494 ff., followed by P. Waltz in *Hesiodé et son Poème Moral*, Paris-Bordeaux, 1906; E. Lisco in *Quaestiones*

Hesiodaeae Crit. et Mythol., Gottingae, 1903, 48-62 : W. Fuss in Versuch einer Analyse von Hesiod's *Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι*, Bornaleipzig, 1910 ; Eduard Meyer, in Genethliakon, Carl Robert, Berlin, 1910 ; and E. K. Rand in Am. Journ. of Phil., xxxii, 2), we find at least a certain restfulness in the hypothesis of literary unity. From this point of view, an admirable critique has been given by R. C. Jebb in his Classical Greek Poetry, p. 79 ff. In his view, there is a background of gloom touching all human destiny, and a foreground of toil and uprightness as the antidote and solace for the gloom. This is indeed a representative picture of the normal Greek attitude toward life, fatalistic and pessimistic, and yet heroic in the face of ills known or unknown (cf. Butcher : Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, p. 145). It requires, too, more of true heroism to face the problems of life without flinching than even to face death itself, hence our admiration of this ancient Greek attitude in general.

The gloomy background referred to continues at least as far as v. 224. At that point the effect of the dark picture is heightened by a contrasted picture of what the world would be if men were just (v. 228-237). There would be peace, fertility, a noble and abundant progeny of man and beast, and an interchange of all the best things of life with all the world. The fable itself is introduced as above stated (just after the description of the Iron Age). The fable therefore is thoroughly tinged with melancholy.

In general then it is plain that the fable is a pointed sermon against injustice. But to whom it is immediately addressed is not made clear. This is made at least somewhat uncertain by the doubtful nature of v. 202, bracketed by some :

Νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεύσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς.

If this line be genuine, as hardly seems likely, it will mean that between the long sections plainly addressed to Perses, 1-202, 274 ff., there is an apostrophe of 10 lines to the judges in the tone of an apology for using the homely confidential Fable ; but why should the poet apologize ? Besides, the judges who are referred to heretofore only incidentally in v. 38 as " receiving bribes " are

addressed in v. 248 as if never similarly addressed on this theme (*δίκην*) before :

*Ω βασιλείς, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοί.

The judges moreover, although we might see in the fable a protest against tyranny, are only accomplices after all, although greedy enough to be sure (cf. *δωροφάγοι*, v. 264). But Perses is the chief wrong-doer, to whom some application of the fable is made later. And yet the fable is plainly not directly addressed to Perses at the outset. Indeed its whole tone and tenor is that of a general climax or finale to the evil prophecy. The fable might therefore be almost considered hieratic or oracular in both form and content, and so of general application, Perses or any other being but an incidental illustration. It would be better on the whole therefore to reject v. 202. (There is an oracle on *δίκη* and *ὑβρις* in Herodotus. So Hesiod, Op. 285, occurs as the last line of an oracle, Her., 6, 86.)

As to the particular way in which the fable is applied to Perses himself. The facts concerning Perses are these. Perses was the younger brother of Hesiod, who had bribed certain judges (*βασιλῆες δωροφάγοι*, vv. 263-4) and had also perjured himself (v. 282) so as to finally obtain more than his share of the patrimony. Perses had lived in idleness and arrogance (*ὑβρις*, v. 213) on his money, until, reduced to beggary, he was forced to come to his brother for help. The only help given is good advice, apparently given with full pardon and in the hope of the brother's reform. Hesiod advises : "go to work, and henceforth always do justly," *ἀεργίῃ δέ τ' ὄνειδος* (v. 311), *μηδ' ὑβριν ὀφείλλε* (v. 213). Now in our text, we have immediately after the fable an address to Perses. This, however, seems in all probability to be out of place, for vv. 274-285, a passage of equal length, are very much more appropriate at this point, as a comparison of the two passages (given below) will show.

(A). V. 213 ff.

*Ω Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης, μηδ' ὑβριν ὀφείλλε·
ὑβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῇ βροτῶ· οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὸς
ῥηιδίως φερέμεν δύναται, βαρύνθει δέ θ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς,

ἐγκύρσας ἄτησιν· ὁδὸς δ' ἐτέρηφι παρελθεῖν
 κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια· δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει
 ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα· παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω.
 Αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὀρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκησιν.
 [τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἐλκομένης ἥ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωνσι
 δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας.]
 ἥ δ' ἔπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἥθεα λαῶν,
 ἡέρα ἐσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα,
 οἷτε μιν ἐξελάσσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν.

(B). V. 274 ff.

ᾧ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσι,
 καὶ νῦν δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλάθεο πάμπαν.
 τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,
 ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς,
 ἐσθήμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς·
 ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἥ πολλὸν ἀρίστη
 γίγνεται. εἰ γὰρ τίς κ' ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεύειν
 γιγνώσκων, τῷ μὲν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς·
 ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσσας
 ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάβας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,
 τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρῃ γενεῇ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·
 ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεῇ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

The latter passage suits the fable better, (1) from its opening words

ᾧ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσι

which are much more appropriate than

ᾧ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφελλε

for Perses no longer possessed the absolute power of the Hawk in the fable, as he could only have the general tone of ὕβρις.

(2) Vv. 277-8,

ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς·
 ἐσθήμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς,

can then refer very directly to the fable. The lower animals

devour one another. Men should not so prey upon one another. Perses should be a man, not a brute ;

ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη / γίγνεται.

(3) Notice πολλὸν ἀρίστη, an echo of πολλὸν ἀρείων in the fable (v. 207). (4) The passage concludes with the dictum that "Right is better than Might in the long run," making a very suitable commentary on the fable itself (vv. 284-5):

τοῦ δὲ τ' ἀμαυρότερη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται ·
ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμένων.

Such simple transpositions as these might go far towards solving the otherwise perplexing problem of the whole poem. (Cf. Ludwig, Berl. Phil. Woch., 1890, p. 496).

But whether addressed to the judges, to Perses, or to both, the fable also has the general didactic aim of the whole poem, viz., to show to all the world that Might is not Right, that the weak should not be oppressed, but, it is implied, the weak should be helped. The fable cannot of course mean to show that because the Hawk has his cruel way to the end, therefore it is useless in this world to "take arms against a sea of troubles"; and hence that the weak must give up the struggle in despair. It is rather a challenge to both deal justly oneself and to help others to obtain justice. The style and detailed characterization are undoubtedly to this general end, and the fable therefore not merely illustrates the general marks of style, but also the general didactic purpose of the Hesiodic Epic.

Of course, the αἰοιδός is incidentally the poet himself, but the thought of others seems to almost obliterate the thought of self. There is therefore no invective or incrimination. The poet is not indulging self-pity primarily any more than pity for cruelty in the animal world, but there is chiefly the loving appeal of altruism. To this aim also is the Fable as such especially suited. Like the homely proverbs and maxims abounding in Hesiod, this fable is not only a popular element of homely poetry, as it doubtless is, but it also has the familiar tone of inner heart relations,

which are naturally and primarily friendly, and unfriendly only when distorted by passion. Indeed Hesiod could not consistently use this fable in any invective or hostile sense whatever. It would seem rather that he is here revealing his "deep compassion for mankind" at its deepest (cf. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 145 ; E. K. Rand, *A. J. P.*, xxxii, 134). The Fable, as it is so capable of doing, expresses the poet's own heart feelings better than anything else could do ; and both the whole tone of this fable and the sympathy of delineation in detail indicates that the poet has learned to "suffer and be strong" in some sense himself. We may even infer this from vv. 214-216 :

ὑβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῷ βροτῷ· οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὸς
 ῥηιδίως φερέμεν δύναται, βαρύθει δέ θ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς,
 ἐγκύρσας ἄτησιν·

Had the poet not so thoroughly learned life's lesson, the *Works and Days* would likely never have been written.

It will be seen therefore that the deviations from normal Fable as noted above are very appropriately and sympathetically introduced to point the moral as well as to adorn the tale. The Fable preserves its peculiar characteristics, and is yet subservient to the setting forth of the loftiest aims of the department.

(8). *Summary.* We may now sum up the points of style mentioned to show wherein the Fable has proved a stylistic test for Hesiod. As we have seen, the Fable has its prevailingly simple style in general, its characteristic clearness and brevity, a maximum of persuasiveness, and the usual liveliness and yet homeliness of characterization and setting. In the adaptation of the Fable to this department, there is the use of Epic metre and diction and of Epic style generally, the selection of fanciful bird characters, the careful delineation of character by artistic means (the use of figures and metrical effects), then finally the setting forth of the high ethical principle of justice in an almost personal, and yet in a disinterested manner ; revealing heart sympathy, and yet clothed in mystical if not oracular form. Surely the real Hesiod is nowhere better revealed than in this fable and its development,

as shown above, just as the real Horace is nowhere better revealed than in his numerous fables. The impersonal epic of Homer has therefore given place to a semi-personal epic which prepares the way for the personal departments of lyric which follow. Homer has no Fable, Archilochus is full of them.

2. LYRIC. ARCHILOCHUS.

The next department historically is the Lyric. In this department, the political individualistic tendencies of the time, as revealed in the revolt against monarchical institutions, is shown not only in the political and philosophical upheaval, but also in the rise of the department of literature which deals with individual passion, the Lyric. The themes of this department were thus more directly and definitely human, and they were democratic. In time, the Elegy was the first branch of Lyric. This often made use of Homeric diction (Christ, *Litt.-Geschichte*, p. 127 ff.), and linked the metrics of the Epic to that of later literature by preserving the dactylic hexameter alternating with a new verse, the dactylic pentameter (Capps, *Homer to Theocritus*, p. 113). The tone of the Elegy too was still lofty and often gnomic, if highly personal. It was too lofty for Fable, so we have no fables in this early Elegy.

It remained for Archilochus, as the chief representative of Iambic Poetry, to employ in large use the homely Fable.

It has been already intimated that the native habitat of Fable is either among children who readily personify Fable characters, or among the untutored who approximate childlikeness in this regard. When used among the cultured or in formal literature, the Fable is used very consciously, and yet it presupposes by its very use the familiarity with which children address one another. The relation between those using and those hearing a Fable is therefore *prima facie* one of especial intimacy; the tone a confidential one. But inasmuch as deepest affection may become bitterest hate, the intimate Fable might be used in bitter lampoon or invective. It is thus that it is used by Archilochus, who may have simply taken up in literature a popular use of the Fable in

billingsgate, cf. the tone of satiric folksongs (Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, 495).

There are two fables at least in the extant fragments, which may be pieced together with more or less plausibility: A, the Fox and Eagle; B, the Fox and Ape King.

A. The Fox and Eagle is told in Halm 5, as follows:

Ἄετος καὶ ἀλώπηξ φιλεῖν ἀλλήλους συνθέμενοι, πλησίον αὐτῶν οἰκεῖν διέγνωσαν, βεβαίωσιν φιλίας τὴν συνθήθειαν ποιούμενοι. Καὶ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τι περιμήκεες δένδρον ἐνεοττοποίησατο· ἡ δὲ εἰσελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν ὑποκείμενον θάμνον ἔτεκεν. Ἐξελθούσης δέ ποτε αὐτῆς ἐπὶ νομῇ, ὁ αἶτος ἀπορῶν τροφῆς, καταπατὰς εἰς τὸν θάμνον καὶ τὰ γεννήματα ἀναρπάσας, μετὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ νεοττῶν κατεθοινήσατο. Ἡ δ' ἀλώπηξ ἐπανελθοῦσα ὡς ἔγνω τὸ πραχθῆν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν νεοττῶν θανάτῳ ἐλυπήθη, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς ἀμύνης ἀπόρῳ· χερσαία γὰρ οὔσα πτηνὸν διώκειν ἡδυνάτει. Διὸ πόρρωθεν στᾶσα, ὃ μόνον τοῖς ἀσθενέσι καὶ ἀδυνάτοις ὑπολείπεται, τῷ ἐχθρῷ κατηρᾶτο. Συνέβη δ' αὐτῷ τῆς εἰς τὴν φιλίαν ἀσεβείας οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δίκην ὑπελθεῖν· θούντων γάρ τινων αἶγα ἐπ' ἀγροῦ, κατακτὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ σπλάχνον ἔμπυρον ἀνήνεγκεν· οὐ κομισθέντος εἰς τὴν καλιὰν, σφοδρὸς ἐμπεσὼν ἄνεμος ἐκ λεπτοῦ καὶ παλαιοῦ κάρφους λαμπρὰν φλόγα ἀνήψε· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καταφλεχθέντες οἱ νεοττοὶ (καὶ γὰρ ἦσαν ἔτι ἀπτήνες οἱ αἰτιδεῖς) ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν κατέπεσον. Καὶ ἡ ἀλώπηξ προσδραμούσα ἐν ὄφει τοῦ αἰτοῦ πάντα αὐτοὺς κατέφαγεν.

Ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ, ὅτι οἱ φιλίαν παρασπονδοῦντες, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδίκημένων ἐκφύγωσι κόλασιν δι' ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλ' οὖν γε τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τιμωρίαν διακροῦνται οὐδ' ὅλως.

With the help of the above version, we may group the fragments as follows (frgs. 85, 81, 83, 84, 82, 86, 92, Hiller; Bergk, 94, 86, 87, 88, 38, 96, 109):

(1) Probably introductory although it might be an ἐπίλογος, frg. 85 (94),

Πάτερ Λυκάμβα, ποῖον ἐφράσω τόδε;
τίς σὰς παρήειρε φρένας;
ᾗς τὸ πρὶν ἡρήρεισθα· νῦν δὲ δὴ πολλὸς
ἀστοῖσι φαίνεται γέλως.

(2) The partnership, frg. 81 (86), with first line transitional but not extant, and fourth line incomplete. (These verses must precede and not follow the fable narrative. Contra Hauvette, *Archiloque*, p. 257).

αἰνός τις ἀνθρώπων ὄδε,
ὥς ἄρ' ἀλώπηξ καίετος ξυνωνίην
ἔμειξαν.

(3) Adding insult to injury, frg. 83 (87),

ὄρᾳς ἴν' ἔστ' ἐκείνος ὑψηλὸς πάγος
τρηχὺς τε καὶ παλίγκοτος,
ἐν τῷ κάθημαι σὴν ἐλαφρίζων μάχην.

(4) The prayer for deliverance, frg. 84 (88),

ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος,
σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὄρᾳς
λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων
ὑβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει.

(5) The vengeance, frg. 82 (38),

προὔθηκε παισὶ δέιπνον αἰγνὲς φέρων.

(6) Application of (2), frg. 86 (96),

ὄρκον δ' ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν
ἄλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν . . .

(7) Prayer parallel to (4), frg. 92 (109),

ὥς δ' ἄν σε θωγὴ λάβοι.

Fable B, the Fox and Ape King, seems to be similar to Halm, 44, given below :

Ἐν συνόδῳ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων πίθηκος ὀρχησάμενος καὶ εὐδοκίμησας βασιλεὺς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐχειροτονήθη· ἀλώπηξ δὲ αὐτῷ φθονήσασα ὥς ἐθεάσατο ἔν τι παγίδι κρέας κείμενον, ἀγαγούσα αὐτον ἐνταῦθα ἔλεγεν, ὥς εὐροῦσα θησαυρὸν αὐτῇ μὲν οὐκ ἐχρήσατο, γέρας δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς βασιλείας τετήρηκε, καὶ παρῆνει αὐτῷ λαβεῖν.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀτημελήτως ἐπελθόντος, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς παγίδος συλληφθέντος, αἰτιωμένου τε τὴν ἀλώπεκα ὡς ἐνεδρεύσασαν αὐτῷ, ἐκείνη ἔφη. 'ὦ πίθηκε, σὺ δὲ τοιαύτην ψυχὴν ἔχων τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων βασιλεύσεις';

Οὕτως οἱ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπερискέπτως ἐπιχειροῦντες σὺν τῷ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι καὶ γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνουσιν.

Under B we may with some probability group frgs. 96, 90, 97, 98, Hiller; Bergk, 89, 107, 90, 91.

(1) Introductory, the Ape met by the Fox, frg. 96 (89),

Ἐρέω τιν' ὑμῖν αἶνον, ὦ Κηρυκίδη,
 ἀχνυμένη σκυτάλη·
 πίθηκος ἦι θηρίων ἀποκριθεὶς
 μοῦνος ἂν' ἐσχατιήν·
 τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἀλώπηξ κερδαλῇ συνήντετο
 πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον.

(The words in the Halm version, ἀγαγοῦσα αὐτὸν ἐνταῦθα, seem to come in here, the Fox leading the Ape to the trap).

(2) The Fox's polite *après vous*, frg. 90 (107),

πάρελθε, γενναῖος γὰρ εἶς.

(3) The Ape caught in the trap, frg. 97 (90),

ρόπτρῳ ἐρειδόμενον.

(Cf. in Halm ὑπὸ τῆς παγίδος συλληφθέντος).

(4) The Ape exposed, frg. 98 (91), cf. the same words in Halm.

τοιήνδε δ, ὦ πίθηκε, τὴν (ψυχὴν) ἔχων.

(Others of course read *πυγῇ*).

Some would refer frg. 96 to the fable of the Fox and the Ape who claimed a pedigree, Babrius, 81, given below (cf. Halm, 43):

κερδοὶ πίθηκος εἶπεν ἦν ὀρᾶς στήλην
 ἐμοὶ πατρώη τ' ἐστὶ καὶτι παππώη.
 κερδὼ πιθήκῃ φησὶν ὡς θέλεις ψεύδου
 ἔλεγχον οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς ἀληθείης'

But there is hardly a point of similarity except in the characters. Besides the dactylic penthemimeral in frgs. 96 and 97 (cf. frg. 99) point to the trap fable, and there is a tolerable fitness throughout if we interpret by means of that fable. See below.

Another Ape fable of Archilochus may be referred to in Aristides, *ὑπὲρ τεττάρων*, 307, 6, 'Αρχίλοχοι πίθηκοι, δύο μορφὰς ἔχοντες. (Cf. Crusius, Rhein. Mus., 49, 305 ff.).

The other animals cited in the Epodes we may consider as merely types, e. g., *ὄνου*, frg. 87, *πέρδικα*, frg. 89, *ἐγχέλυας*, frg. 108, *κορώνη*, frg. 109, *κηρύλος*, frg. 109a.

At all events, even these two fables, if the grouping is correct, are sufficient to show that the Fable is a distinctive style-test for Archilochus.

We may examine the points of style as before.

(1). In regard to *ἀφέλεια*.

(a) In Structure. The "strung-on" style is present, but none of the straight-on order of words. The style in general is simpler than that of Hesiod's fable. The arrangement of words is not so sententious or heavy, but more artistic. The following may be cited as examples of sententious arrangement:

(A, 1, frg. 85) Πάτερ Λυκάμβα, ποῖον ἐφράσω τόδε;

τίς σὰς παρήειρε φρένας;

(cf. the emphatic τόδε at end of first line with ὅδε, A, 2, frg. 81).

(A, 3, frg. 83) σὴν ἐλαφρίζων μάχην.

(A, 4, frg. 84) ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος,

σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὄρᾳς

λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων

ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει.

(A, 6, frg. 86) ὄρκον δ' ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν (where ὄρκον and μέγαν at either end re-enforce each other, cf. B, 4, frg. 98, τοιήνδε δ', ὦ πίθηκε, τὴν ψυχὴν).

(B, 1, frg. 96) πυκνὸν ἐχοῦσα νόον.)

This arrangement is sententiously artistic. See other examples below under *τραχύτης*. In general, however, the order is merely the usual inverted Greek order.

(b) In Diction. The diction in the main is very simple, being suited to the homeliness of the Fable itself. Nevertheless apart from the poeticisms (see below) some artistic words are purposely chosen to give a further artistic coloring to the scene. In A, 3, the *πάγος* is not only *ύψηλός* and *τρηχύς* but also *παλίγκοτος*; in A, 4, *ἔργα ἀνθρώπων* are divided into *λεωργά* and *θεμιστά*; in A, 1, *πολὺς γέλως* is abstract for concrete, cf. *σκυτάλη* in B, 1; *Κηρυκίδη* in B, 1 is an artistic Epic title, made for the purpose. The Fox in B, 1, is not only *κερδαλή* but also described as *πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον*. But even the adornment is all appropriately simple and there is no grouping of long words. In fable A, neither animal has an epithet applied to it, while in Hesiod both are so described. Indeed there are few *epitheta ornantia* or pompous circumlocutions. The style is too direct for that. Cf. Crusius, Archilochus, P. W., p. 500.

(2). As to *τραχύτης*. The Lyric smoothness is almost absolute. The only line showing any lack of the quality is B, 4, frg. 98, *τοιγύδε δ', ὃ πίθηκε, τὴν (ψυχὴν) ἔχων*, which may be purposely a rough and hateful summing up, or more hateful still if we should read *πυγὴν* here.

The opposite quality, *γλυκύτης*, is therefore present in a high degree. It is shown (a) in the *Metre*. The metre is distinctly popular in flavor, cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 3, 8, and yet deliberate, often dignified:

ὁ δ' ἱαμβος αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν . . . δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστήσαι.

The iambic metre is nearest to prose and is therefore the usual metre of dialogue in the drama. Its ready resolution of spondees, and occasional introduction of anapæsts, etc., also marks a deviation from the set, invariable rules of Epic hexameter in the direction of prose speech. Its shorter foot also gives a greater readiness in the expression of sudden changes of passion, a hard thing in Epic. This is all nearer to the fitful fever of life itself with its ever changing gusts of passion. The short double trimeter is also a facile verse form, and alternating with the dimeter gives an

effective weapon of invective. Cf. Crusius, Pauly-Wissowa, p. 499. "Die iambische Trimeter und Dimeter sind Hiebe und Stiche für die Treulosen." The dactylic penthemimeral of our fable B, in conjunction with iambic Trimeter, gives further opportunity of invective in mock-heroic vein, another formal point of contact with the Epic. See *infra*.

The metre in general in these fables is beautifully smooth, showing unmistakably the finest lyric art. To this end the variety of verse length and of metrical feet conduces without jarring. The verse is (a) of regular iambic trimeter + iambic dipody; (b) inversion of (a), probably only apparent, e. g. A, 2, (cf. Crusius, p. 498); and (c) iambic trimeter + dactylic penthemimeral (B, 1-4). The feet throughout are smoothly regular (except one case of synizesis, B, 1); and where two sorts of verse alternate, there is consummate art in the transition. The short quick verses give abundant opportunity of invective attack, but the smoothness and freshness of this new metrical device are marked, as noticed below under *ἐνάργεια*.

(b) In the *Diction*. While the diction is very much nearer to prose than that of Hesiod's fable, we find two *epitheta ornantia* in the fragments quoted, *παλίγκοτος* (frg. 83), *κερδαλή* (frg. 96), one Mock-Epic patronymic, *Κηρυκίδη* (frg. 96), and the following apparently poetical words also: *ρόπτρον*, *ἐρείδω* (frg. 97), *ξυνωνία* (frg. 81), *πάγος*, *ἐλαφρίζω* (frg. 83), *λεωργός*, *θεμιστός* (frg. 84), *ἄχθυμαι*, *ἐσχατιή* (frg. 96).

(c) In the *Balance*. Beside the sententious arrangement noted above, we have frequent pairing of words, simple and yet highly artistic, giving poise and dignity without heaviness, e. g., (A, 3) *τρηχὺς τε καὶ παλίγκοτος* (frg. 83); (A, 4) *λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη* (frg. 84); (A, 6) *ἄλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν* (frg. 86). So there is a finished completeness in several individual lines. A, 5, 6 (frg. 82, 86),

*προὔθηκε παισὶ δεῖπνον αἰνὲς φέρων,
ὄρκον ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν.*

Metrical poising is well shown in both A and B, especially in B, each short verse heightening the special effect of the whole.

(See below on *ἐνάργεια*). In all this, there is less of the conscious rhetoric of Hesiod and more of the art of a polished artist who introduces art unnoticed. So the Klangfiguren are natural rather than artificial (Crucius, p. 500), e. g., *σὰς φρένας* (A, 1) *σὴν μάχην* (A, 3). There is nothing therefore at any point to mar the artistic *γλυκύτης*.

(3). *σαφήνεια*. We have, as it happens, very little of the descriptive parts of the fables. What we have, however, is eminently characterized by clearness, and we may infer that the whole possessed remarkable vividness of delineation and description.

(4). *συντομία*. Of this we cannot judge, but doubtless, as in B, the poet developed his story quickly or slowly as would suit his epodic purpose. This passage, for example, is elaborated much beyond the sententious brevity of Hesiod's fable, for the aim here is not to impress a principle but to arouse or express passion, which may be done at any length. With the same purpose Horace compresses or enlarges fables, or alters the story or shifts the emphasis at will. See on Horace, Archibald, *Proceedings A. P. A.*, 1911, p. xiv ff.

(5). *ἐνάργεια*. (α) *ἦθος*. The types are one bird, the Eagle, and two beasts, the Fox and the Ape. (α) The Eagle. The Eagle was a type in general of haughty sovereignty, both in heaven and on earth, cf. the double eagle on Roman coins (Keller, *Tiere*, p. 276). He was the minister of Zeus in the lightning (*ibid.*, pp. 238, 251, 254), and stands for unassailable might, here represented by Lycambes. In Pindar, *O.*, 2, 96; *P.* 5, 112, he is a bird of nobility. From his habitat, however, the Eagle lends himself, like all other birds, to mystery, and also, as in our fable, to trickery, a fit *ἀντίπαλος* for the Fox, his traditional enemy. With the tone of the Eagle's boast (A, 3), cf. *Horap.*, 2, 56, where a king who is aloof and disdainful is compared to an eagle. See in general D. W. Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, p. 1 ff.

(β) The Fox. The Fox is a strong character, wise in good or in ill (cf. *Semonides*, 7, 7 ff.; *Aristotle*, *H. A.*, 9, 120; *Plut.*,

Moral., 971A; Aristophanes, Eq., 1069; Pindar, I, 4, 80; Keller, Tiere, p. 181). He was admired for his ready wit and his resourcefulness (cf. the Odyssey, which celebrates not so much the wanderings as the resourcefulness of Odysseus). But the Fox could and would turn his talent to an evil purpose, to achieve which he was willing to bide his time. Hence he is at times a braggart villain cowardly at heart (Aristotle, 488b 20, f., Aristophanes, Pax, 1189). It is because of his great versatility that the Fox is so good a type of human nature as to be the most frequent of all Fable characters. Cf. the extensive monograph, Reinhart Fuchs, by J. Grimm.

(γ) The Ape. The Ape is a type of cruel trickery (Keller, p. 5). It personifies the acme of evil (cf. Semonides, 7, 71 ff., and Aelian, N. A., 7, 21, *κακοηθέστατον τῶν ζώων*). Its ugliness of face contributed to the hatred of the Ape. Cf. *αἰσχίστα . . . πρόσωπα* (Semonides, 7, 73).

Such are the types themselves. Unfortunately the fragments do not furnish us with much basis of *ἡθοποιία*. Yet we have several clever touches by way of characterization:

Fable A. (1) The Eagle. The Eagle, after making an alliance with the Fox (A, 2) and according to the Halm version, pillaging the Fox's lair of its young, adds insult to injury in haughty defiance (A, 3). Finally, in answer to the Fox's prayer (A, 4), dire retribution comes to the Eagle. The Eagle typifies Lycambes, who had promised his daughter Neobule to Archilochus, the Fox (A, 6), and then refused him her hand in favor of another suitor, Leophilus. Neobule is the Fox's family snatched away by the ruthless, taunting Lycambes.

(2) The Fox. There is little characterization of the Fox in our fragments, excepting in his well-worded, forceful prayer to Zeus, pouring forth his sad tale of injury, and appealing for succor and for justice. Such is Archilochus, who feels he has been most unjustly and harshly treated, for he had sincerely loved Neobule (frgs. 102, 104, H.), and apparently had the promise of her hand (A, 6).

Fable B. (1) The Fox. The Fox in the second fable is a

very different character. Far from being righteous, he uses much cunning. The Fox meets the Ape when alone and therefore at the mercy of his quicker wit. The Fox has craftily concocted a plot, cf. *κερδαλή, πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον* (B, 1), to entrap the Ape, which he does (B, 3), and then he taunts him in turn for his false pretensions in allowing himself to be made king by the other animals (Halm, 44). These pretensions are shown to be false by the Ape's lack of wit in falling into a trap in his greedy haste (B, 3).

(2) The Ape. The Ape's character is described simply as above stated.

Who then are the Fox and the Ape in fable B? It must be confessed that this is a most baffling question. The setting is apparently this: Some messenger has come reluctantly from Lycambes to bring evil tidings to Archilochus, cf. B, 1,

*ἐρέω τιν' ὑμῖν αἶνον, ὦ Κηρυκίδη
ἀχρυσμένη σκυτάλη.*

To him Archilochus tells the fable to be reported to the sender of the message. The evil tidings must be the rejection of the suit of Archilochus. Now it will not answer, if this be the fable of the Fox and Ape King, to assume that either Lycambes or a favored suitor is the Ape. Either might perhaps be considered the Ape if the other Fox and Ape fable of Babrius, 81, were referred to, where the Ape asserts his pedigree, but why all the emphasis on the craft of the Fox and the aloneness of the Ape, if the Fox is to conquer merely by a *jeu d'esprit*. We are therefore shut up to the following conclusion: Lycambes is the would-be Fox, who has led the presumptuous Archilochus, the Ape, into a trap with his daughter, Neobule, as bait, and then laughed at him for his presumption and stupid greed. The mother of Archilochus we know was a *δούλη*, while Lycambes was of aristocratic family (Christ, *Griech. Litt.*, p. 494). Accepting this, therefore, as a possible interpretation, we may pass over to the consideration of the *πάθος* of these fables, which in this department will also of necessity include a statement of the Specific Purpose of the Fables.

(b) *πάθος* and departmental aim. Where, as said above, there is a personal tone in literature, the *πάθος* of the action must reflect the departmental aim, for the writer is setting forth his own feelings through some character or other. Moreover the real relationships of life are discussed either to justify them or to inveigh against them. The latter may be done (a) by argument to show that a position falsely taken will bring an evil end and therefore incur ridicule (A, 1),

*νῦν δὲ δὴ πολὺς
ἀστοῖσι φαίνεται γέλως,*

or (b) the position itself is directly shown to be ridiculous. Fable A appears to illustrate the former method, and fable B the latter, for fable A is more didactic and fable B more ironical.

We may now say that the main purpose of the Epodes is self-justification, and that incidental to this is the ridicule or lampoon of the poet's adversaries. It is significant as Hauvette (p. 257 ff.) notes, that fables are only found in Archilochus in the Epodes, while they are quite lacking in the otherwise imitated Epodes of Horace. The fables therefore must be so employed as to further this aim. Their highly personal tone enables the poet to speak for himself the more feelingly inasmuch as one or other of the Fable characters speaks for him. Herein is the artist enabled to disguise his passion. Further, in the characterization of himself or his foe in the Fable itself, he is able also to conceal his art as well. But the art is present none the less, and it is high art. Indeed it is the very acme of the poet's art, which lifts the Fable from its customary tone of vulgar familiarity, while retaining its high personality and passion, to a plane of dignity suited to the Lyric, and appropriate to the rank of the poet as an artist. Hence the more smooth and flowing the poet's verse and the more polished and graceful his diction, the more dignified and therefore the more weighty his plea. It is this naturalness and yet beauty of style so well suited to his theme which gives force to the personal *ῥηθοποιία* of Archilochus, just as *τὸ πρέπον* in this connection is commended in Lysias by Dionysius (De Lys., c. 9). Horace, undoubtedly an imitator of Archilochus in all but the

invective tone and the iambic metre, attains to this art in many of his fables (cf. Archibald, *Proc. A. P. A.*, l. c.).

We may gather up therefore some of the evidences of the poet's art in his departmental use of the Fable.

(1) Fable A. Leaving out the possible prologue, A, 1, we have a popular Fable story, not one invented (cf. *αἶνος ἀνθρώπων*, frg., and *λόγος ἀνθρώπων*, Pind., N., 1, 6). As with Proverb, so with Fable, its very existence in the popular folk-lore is an evidence that its teaching has the stamp of approval of perhaps generations of people, cf. Trench, *Proverbs*, passim. The introduction *αἶνος ἀνθρώπων* therefore gives gnomic weight to the story; so far both popular, *προσαγωγός* and *πιθανός*. But, immediately, the style swings clear of the popular, retaining only the approximate metrical form of common speech, this too being highly polished by rhythm and euphony. So in line 2, *ξυνωνίην ἔμειξαν*, is a phrase highly poetic, and like all the other poetic and especially the Epic phraseology employed, is intended to re-inforce the metrical effects in a mock-heroic tone. Cf. the frequent paro-tragedy in Aristophanes, e. g., *Nub.*, 30, *ἀτὰρ τί χρέος ἔβα με μετὰ τὸν Πασίαν*, and Horace, *Sat.*, 2, 16, 100 ff., the mock-heroic description of the journey of the two mice: *Iamque tenebat | Nox medium cæli spatium cum ponit uterque | . . . vestigia.*

So with the boast of the Eagle in A, 3 :

ὄρᾱς ἴν' ἐστ' ἐκείνος ὑψηλὸς πάγος
τρηχὺς τε καὶ παλὺγκοτος.

In this vein also is the elaborate prayer of the Fox in Epic style all but the metre, although with more rhetorical art in the iteration (cf. Hauvette, *Archiloque*, p. 277), but in thought directly suggesting Hesiod :

ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κρίτος,
σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὄρᾱς
λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστὰ, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων
ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει.

This is as suggested an echo of many ὕβρις passages in Hesiod, e. g., Op., 238, 9,

Οἷς δ' ὕβρις τε μέμηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,
τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς.

Cf. also Op., 253-5,

τρεῖς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων·
οἳ ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα,
ἥερα ἐσσάμενοι πάντῃ φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἶαν.

The comment of Hesiod, that there is no justice among brute beasts, Op., 276 ff., also heightens the mock-heroic effect of the Fox's prayer in our fable. Thus also the appeal to Zeus echoes the same appeal so frequently in the near background of Hesiod's poem: cf. the passages quoted above; while the Eagle character in fable A has much of the flavor of the cruel Hawk in Hesiod. Hence the biting effect of the characterization in our fable.

In Hesiod's fable there is only a one-sided dialogue. Here the two opposing characters reveal themselves more clearly and fully in speech. But as in Hesiod, so here, the speech sets forth the philosophy of the situation, cf. the speeches of Thucydides, which always contain the philosophy of the historical situation. The love of debate is shown everywhere in Greek literature, cf. especially the *ἀγών* in Greek comedy. The Greeks were ever a people of thought and of speech as well as of action. The dialogue in our fable is therefore sententious, if also dramatic. In the Fox's prayer, we may even call the dialogue didactic or ethical, for the principle is of general application. The Fox is wise, wise enough indeed to pray for retribution, a very Greek, for this was a part of their creed. Cf. Lysias, *contra Eratos*, 24,

τοιαύτην γὰρ γνώμην ἔχω· ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τούτου ὠφελείᾳ καὶ
πρὸς ἕτερον περὶ τούτου διαλέγεσθαι ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζω, ἐπὶ
δὲ τῇ τούτου βλάβῃ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν τούτον ὅσιον καὶ εὐσεβές.

This fable therefore goes farther than that of Hesiod and shows that Might is never Right, and that Nemesis is still on earth despite Hesiod, Op., 199 f.,

ἀθανάτων μετὰ φύλον ἵτον προλιπόντ' ἀνθρώπους
Αἰδῶς καὶ Νέμεσις.

The relationship of this fable to the fable of Hesiod is thus very clearly seen, both in tone and in part in style. The poet therefore consciously uses much art, and to the end that he may show Lycambes that the latter is persevering in his own downfall, and has already incurred the ridicule of his fellow-citizens; the poet himself also will have his rightful revenge in due time.

(2) Fable B. The intent of this fable, as far as we may explain it, has been set forth above. But quite apart from the actual reference of the fable, its tone as we see it in B, 1, at all events, is that of mockery. This is indicated very clearly by the short parenthetical, explanatory dactylic lines, which seem in each case to lightly and mockingly repeat the thought of the main narrative as carried on in the iambic trimeter. There is the same melody and smoothness as in the other fable, but apparently not the same attempt at loftiness. This too seems to show that the Fox this time is the one ridiculed, i. e., Lycambes. As to the theory that the poet here makes himself the butt of the fable to illustrate the way in which Lycambes seems to view him, and that he waits to parry it all in the sequel, perhaps by telling fable A, in a different metre because of the different theme, we have parallels enough in Horace; cf. especially the Frog Fable, Sat., 2, 3, 314 ff., where Horace has Damasippus tell this fable against Horace himself, who parries the attack merely by the art with which the story is told (cf. also Sat., 1, 6, 22; 2, 3, 188). This Fable of Archilochus is at all events very artistic. Cf. Crusius, p. 495, "Die iambisch daktylischen Epoden sind die reichsten und kühnsten Bildungen." The art therefore as shown in (a) arrangement of words, (b) easy metrical transition from iambic measure to the lighter dactyls (in contrast to the passionate spondaic beginning of the second line in frg. 102 :

Δύστηνος ἔγκειμαι πόθῳ
ἄψυχος χαλεπῇσι θεῶν ὀδύνησιν ἔκητι
πεπαρμένος δι' ὀστέων),

and (c) the general lightness of the treatment, point to mockery or ridicule as the whole aim of the fable.

(6). *Summary.* We have indubitable evidence therefore that the use of Fable is a sure stylistic test for the Iambic Poetry of Archilochus. This use of Fable is not only in keeping with the employment of many proverbs and maxims, cf. Crusius, p. 501, (another link with Hesiod), but it is even more generally indicative, for as Crusius says, p. 501, "Mit besonderer Vorliebe wird die Tierfabel angewandt," and on the same page, "Die Art wie A. die Tiertypen anwendet und ausführt, zeigt dass er die Tierwelt gut beobachtet hat. Doch dient die Fabel dem Dichter durchweg als Rüstzeug im Kampfe; um so mehr bemerkenswerter ist die Lebendigkeit und Ausführlichkeit, mit der er diese Stücke behandelt hat" (cf. Hauvette, Archiloque, p. 256, 290). Hence Christ in his *Griechische Litteraturgeschichte* gives a prominent place to the Fable as an Iambic device, with the caption "Die Iambische Poesie und die Fabel," and says concerning Archilochus (p. 136), "Mit Geschick flocht er das populäre Element der Fabel in seine Lieder."

3. LYRIC PROPER. TIMOCREON. SCOLIA.

(1). Timocreon. He is the only lyric-writer, so far as we know, who used Fables in his verse. We cannot prove that Stesichorus wrote fables in verse. Pindar does not refer to Fable in O., 11, 19 (cf. Philemon, *Mein.*, iv, 32) or in P., 2, 77, although Archilochus had just been mentioned, v. 55. His fable may have suggested the figure of v. 77.

Timocreon (No. 3, given below) alludes to the fable of the Fox who had lost its own tail, and tried to get the other Foxes to dock theirs (cf. Halm, 46). Timocreon defends himself on the charge of Medizing by saying that others have been induced to dock their tails also, Foxes though they be. Of course he is not the first Fox in the fable.

Οὐκ ἄρα Τιμοκρέων μῶνος
Μήδοισιν ὀρkiaτόμει

ἀλλ' ἐντὶ καῖλλοι δὴ πονηροί
οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνα κόλουρις
ἐντὶ καὶ ἄλλαι ἀλώπεκες.

We have here a pretty little fable, somewhat idyllic in style and probably complete as it stands. Such brief allusion to a well-known fable is all that is necessary. Cf. Aristophanes, *Vesp.*, 1446, Horace, *Sat.*, 1, 6, 22, Petronius, 74. Indeed it is often the height of art to suggest rather than to portray. Besides this is a defence (cf. Smyth, *ad loc.*) and therefore it is the better of brevity, brevity being also the soul of wit, especially in repartee. Further, the subject of Medizing was a delicate one, and was all the better of a slight reference. Moreover, but one point of the fable is emphasized, viz., the general docking, i. e., the prevalence of Medizing.

In spite of the brevity and slightness of the allusion, however, we may see several points of style.

(1). ἀφέλεια. The style is obviously extremely simple. The ὀρθότης is striking. The diction is also of the simplest.

(2). τραχύτης. This is not present, but γλυκύτης is shown in (a) the Doric and poetical diction: ὀρκιατόμει, ἐντί (twice), μόνα, μοῦνος.

(b) The Melody. The proportion of musical vowels and liquids to syllables is 51 % and 55 % respectively, totaling 106 %, above the percentage of the fable of Hesiod, 76 %, and of the fables of Archilochus, 91 %, and about equal to that of typical passages of Sophocles, *Antigone*, vv. 100–109, 148–154, 109 %. The general blending is also excellent.

(c) The Metre. The metre is various, but the transition is artistic if forceful and the whole lyrically smooth. The scheme follows :

— υυ | — υυ | — — | — ||
> — | υ — | υ — | υ —
— | — υ | — > | — υ | — >
— υ | — υ | — υ | — υ
— υυ | — υυ | — υυ

Thus we have the first line dactylic hepthemimeral, followed by

an iambic dipody, two trochaic dipodies (the first with anacrusis) and a dactylic tripody. Each verse is different, but plays its part well in the general effect of the whole. (See below on *ἐνάργεια*).

(3) and (4). Little need be said of *σαφήνεια*, and the *συντομία* is evidently that of any self-justification.

(5). *ἐνάργεια*. This appears in the Fox characters. There is humor also in Foxes being tricked. It is highly interesting to catch a clever rogue. But there is no attempt at *ῥθοποιία* further.

(6). *πιθανότης*. It is often alleged as extenuation of guilt, that many others are involved. Indeed if a revolution be successful, it is frequently justified by the issue. The whole question is plainly prudential, as are nearly all the problems of Fable wherein the Fox figures.

(7). Departmental purpose. This fable serves as an impersonal, yet metrically an impassioned defense against the charge preferred. It is worth while noticing the special metrical effects. The first line is mock-heroic, especially the metrically emphatic spondees. Cf. also the use of *ἄρα* of surprise, as often with the imperfect. Cf. Gildersleeve, Greek Syntax, 1, 220. Here there is angry surprise. The change to the iambics is in the tone of deliberate angry retort, then the running trochees of the next two verses pass from anger to festive sarcasm, heightened still more by the closing dactylic line with its mocking repetition of verse 4 (cf. Archilochus, fable B), and also of verse 3 (cf. *ἐντὶ καὶ ἄλλαι* with *ἐντὶ κάλλαι*), and the final alliteration *ἄλλαι ἀλώπεκες*. It is all very cleverly done, and while it produces *γλυκύτης*, cleverly carries out the bitterly satirical purpose. This is all quite Archilochian. We cannot tell whether the fable was directed at Themistocles or not, as the familiar tone of the fable itself might indicate. But the aim at all events is plainly that of a lampoon in self-defense, and in this respect is quite contrary to the whole general aim of the Doric Lyric (cf. Christ, Litt.-Gesch., p. 168).

Little more can be said of Timocreon's use of the Fable. It may be that he used it widely, and also that Stesichorus did the same. The fable of Timocreon is really a scholion (Smyth, ad loc.).

(2) *Scolia*. Fables in *scolia* were no doubt very popular. This one is doubtless a good example. In *scolia*, however, we must of necessity notice the use and style only in a general way.

Fables were not only told at banquets, Aristoph., *Vesp.*, 1260, but were sung in *scolia* also. How far back this goes we cannot tell, perhaps very far. Yet the Athenian *scolia* belong to about the middle of the fifth century. Reitzenstein, *Epigram und Skol.*, p. 15.

Scolion, 16, Bgk., is the only one extant containing a fable, that of the Crab and Serpent (cf. Halm 346):

‘Ο καρκίνος ὦδ’ ἔφα
χαλᾷ τὸν ὄφιν λαβών·
εὐθύν χρῆ τὸν ἐταῖρον ἔμμεν
καὶ μὴ σκολιά φρονεῖν.’

This scolion is strongly gnostic, and was apparently sung to illustrate a proposed theme, cf. Smyth, *op. cit.*, c. It was the liking for the gnostic which made riddles also so much in favor at symposia. We have an adaptation of a proverb also in Scolion 20, Bgk. The gnostic nature of *scolia* accounts for the brevity of description in our fable. The emphasis is laid on the words of the Crab. As said above, brief allusion to a popular fable is all that was necessary. We need not therefore maintain with Reitzenstein (*op. cit.*, p. 19) that the fable here “ist kein selbständiges Lied.” Besides the stanza of four short or two long lines is almost invariable in the *scolia*. The metre, like the Doric dialect, is simple and popular. The Glyconic third foot with the others anacrustic catalectic pherecratics (Smyth, p. 483) may point to improvisation. The word play in εὐθύν, σκολιά is popular. Burger, *Herm.*, 27, 360, Smyth, l. c., Volkmann, *Rhet.*, p. 563.

The Crab and the Serpent were natural enemies. Cf. Ael., *N. A.*, 16, 38. The Serpent’s crooked character is seen in the fable. We have the natural enemies therefore making a truce, and then having a quarrel, after one finds out the real character of the other. This is very true to human nature. The ready wit in the whole scene, as well as its sententious brevity and the ener-

getic swing of the last two verses combine pleasantry with gnomic content in a characteristic manner. Of course there is no invective or personal tone at all. This fable must, therefore, be a good sample of Fables in Scolia.

4. HISTORY. HERODOTUS.

The history of semi-prehistoric times, as we might expect, has frequent reference to Fables as being used in the way of defense or appeal. Herodotus (I, 141), Philistus (F. H. G. Mueller, frg. 16, 1, 187) and Livy, all record Fables as being so used. (Cf. also the two fables of Aristotle, Rhet., 2, 20). The introduction of Fables in the historical narrative is therefore quite apart from any possible departmental influence of Epic or Lyric on History.

Herodotus records but one fable, that of the Piper and Fishes (I, 141) told by Darius to the Ionians and Aeolians who, after refusing to revolt from Cyrus, had sued for mercy, but too late. The text of the fable follows:

ἄνδρα φὰς αὐλητὴν ἰδόντα ἰχθῦς ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ αὐλέειν, δοκέοντά σφεας ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἐς γῆν· ὥς δὲ ψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος, λαβεῖν ἀμφίβληστρον καὶ περιβαλεῖν τε πλήθος πολλὸν τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ ἐξεύρσαι, ἰδόντα δὲ παλλομένους εἰπεῖν ἄρα αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς ἰχθῦς· Παύεσθέ μοι ὄρχεόμενοι, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐμέο αὐλέοντος ἠθέλετε ἐκβαίνειν ὄρχεόμενοι.

This fable will show when discussed in the usual manner, the nearest parallel to the Fable style of Aristotle, each corroborating the normality of the other, if not giving a certain amount of evidence as to the early *sermo cotidianus*.

(1). ἀφέλεια. (a) The εἰρομένη λέξις, general in our author (Abicht, I, p. 26), is very pronounced here. (b) The order of words is strikingly and invariably verb/object, subject/verb, with the one seeming exception of the pronoun αὐτόν, which however is appositional, 'himself,' not pronominal, 'he.' In marked contrast is the succeeding section in the author's usual style, simple as that is: Κύρος μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τοῖσι Ἰωσι καὶ τοῖσι Αἰολεῦσι

τῶνδε εἵνεκα ἔλεξε, where verb follows object, and at some distance. Contrast also the rather complex absolute clause with its longer cola and epanalepsis, ὅτι δὴ οἱ Ἴωνες πρότερον αὐτοῦ Κύρου δεηθέντος δι' ἀγγέλων ἀπίστασθαι σφεας ἀπὸ Κροίσου οὐκ ἐπείθοντο, τότε δὲ κατεργασμένων τῶν πρηγμάτων ἦσαν ἔτοιμοι πείθεσθαι Κύρῳ, with the short bare cola of our fable and the simple conversational gen. ἐμέο αὐλέοντος. (Cf. Spieker, *Am. Journ. of Phil.*, 6, 340 f.).

(c) The diction is of the very simplest. There is not the slightest adornment. The only particles are δέ, καί, τε, οὐδ' and ἄρα. There are four pronouns, σφεας, αὐτόν, μοι, ἐμέο, but only one adjective of any sort, πολλόν, denoting quantity.

The Ionisms and Poeticisms while not making the style less simple, make it less bare. The Ionisms are: θαλάσση, αὐλείν (cf. αὐλέοντος), δοκέοντα, σφεας, ἐς, πολλόν, ἐξειρύσαι, ἐμέο.

The Poeticisms are δοκέοντα ("think"), ἐξελεύσεσθαι (rare in prose. Cf. Starkie, *Vesp.*, 15, n.; Rutherford, *N. P.*, 110); παλλομένους (Rutherford, *N. P.*, p. 29). Hermogenes finds a charm in the Ionic dialect itself (Walz 3, 319): ἡ γὰρ Ἰᾶς οὔσα ποιητικὴ φύσει ἐστὶν ἡδεῖα. The use of actual poetical diction adds to this charm and shows the influence of the Epic after all in the Fable style. (Cf. Dionysius, *de C.*, 5). Cf. the general tone of Herodotus's style (Walz, *l. c.*).

(2). *τραχύτης*. The artistic coloring of the diction, and the general melody of the passage counteract any noticeable ruggedness of arrangement. To this is added (a) a few figures: alliteration, περιβαλεῖν πλῆθος πολλόν, with pairing τε . . . καὶ περιβαλεῖν, τε . . . καὶ ἐξειρύσαι, and the emphatic repetition of the letter ε in οὐδ' ἐμέο αὐλέοντος ἠθέλετε ἐκβαίνειν ὀρχεόμενοι. (b) frequent prepositions and pronominal subjects expressed rather than understood (as in Aristotle's fable), and (c) the varying of infinitives in the O. O. with the finite forms of the O. R.

(3). *σαφήνεια*. The clearness is remarkable, chiefly (a) because of the pronouns and prepositions mentioned, the latter being used very accurately; and (b) because of the careful use of technical

terms: *ἄνδρα αὐλητήν*, (cf. Baehrens, ad. loc.), cf. also *Iliad*, 6 315, professional, *τέκτονες ἄνδρες*; *περιβαλεῖν*, cf. Menander. frg. 15 (Meineke, 4, 78), Aristotle, 537 a20; *ἐχειρύσαι*, cf. Homer, *Od.*, 22, 386.

(4). *συντομία*. The clearness, for the reasons mentioned, does not interfere with brevity. The events are quickly narrated in seven aorists, while there is, however, plenty of description in nine presents and imperfects. Hence there is a great deal of action packed into a very small compass. The reason for the brevity is shown in *ὀργῇ ἐχόμενος* following the fable. Cyrus will waste few words on them now, hence the story is briefly told. So the dialogue containing the argument is very much compressed. *Παύσεθέ μοι ὀρχέομενοι, ἐπεὶ, οὐδ' ἐμέο αὐλέοντος ἠθέλετε ἐκβαίνειν ὀρχέομενοι*. The brevity is therefore sententious.

(5). *ἐνάργεια*. To this the dialect and general charm of style contribute. The type characters are really colorless, representing Power and Procrastinating, Pleasure-seeking Weakness. But as there is liveliness in the narration in general, there is liveliness in the delineation of the character of the Piper. He is as said a professional and his manner and outfit are in keeping. He has full power over the Fish by his music, (on attracting fish by music, cf. Aelian, H. A., 1, 39), and indulges in sarcasm, as he laughs them to scorn with his ultimatum, *παύσεθέ μοι ὀρχέομενοι*. Ridicule is shown in (a) the irony in *μοι*, (b) the repetition of *ὀρχέομενοι* (not naïve repetition), (c) the surprised *ἄρα*, (d) the indifferent *εἰπεῖν . . . πρὸς*, and (e) the emphatic *ἐμέο* clause at the end. Especially noteworthy is the *πάθος* of alliteration shown in *περιβαλεῖν πλήθος πολλόν*. Cf. Timocreon, 3, *ἄλλαι ἀλώπεκες*; Homer, *Il.*, 6, 344, the self-imprecation of Helen, *ἐμεῖο, κυνὸς κακομηχάνου κρυόεσσης*; Sophocles, *Antigone*, 4-6, showing 5 initial *ου's*, 4 *α's* and 6 ultimate *ω's*,

οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐτ' ἀλγεινὸν οὐτ' ἀτήσιμον
οὐτ' αἰσχρὸν οὐτ' ἄτιμον ἔσθ', ὅποιον οὐ
τῶν σῶν τε καμῶν οὐκ ὅπωπ' ἐγὼ κακῶν.

And even Lysias, who is said by Dionysius to be wanting in πάθος (De Lys., c. 19), has three good examples of such alliterative passages in the *Contra Eratos.*: (a) § 14, σὺ οὖν ταῦτα πάσχοντί μοι πρόθυμον παράσχου τὴν σεαυτοῦ δύναμιν; (b) § 37, οὐδ' ἂν . . . δις ἀποθανόντες δίκην δοῦναι δύναιντ' ἄξιαν; (c) § 97, εἰς πολλὰς πόλεις πλανηθέντες καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐκκεκηρυττόμενοι.

(6). *πιθανότης*. The Persuasiveness under the circumstances is complete; the Ionians and Aeolians had no alternative but to abjectly submit.

(7). *General summary*. We see much of τὸ πρέπον in this speech. The angry Cyrus is well characterized as the Piper. Herodotus the simple story-teller par excellence (Abicht, 1, p. 27), and here at his simplest, puts a Fable most appropriately into the mouth of the lordly Cyrus, disguising, as the Fable may, the vulgarity of passion in the mouth of a man of rank, but giving his words the maximum of unanswerableness. The ἡθοποιία is excellent. So elsewhere in the speeches of Herodotus it is remarkably clear, especially in the speeches of women (cf. 3, 119; 3, 32; 6, 69) and particularly those of Artemisia the woman with a man's mind and courage and style (cf. 8, 68; 8, 102). Similar in ethopoetic color are the many Proverbs and Maxims of Herodotus (cf. 1, 47, 207; 3, 53; 4, 149, 154; 6, 1, etc.), which along with the use of Fable mark a homeliness of literary tone in our author, but the artistic handling of all these popular elements indicates the dramatic artist as well who weaves together very many diverse elements into a unified dramatic picture of the Persian invasion.

5. COMEDY. ARISTOPHANES.

The chief aim of Comedy is fun, and the Fable in comedy is simple parody. Aristophanes alone of the comic poets has Fables, and only by allusion. The stylistic criticism will therefore be of a general nature. Aristophanes alludes to three fables: the Beetle and Eagle, Vesp., 1446, Pax, 129, Lys., 695; the Mice and

Weasel, Vesp., 1182; the Fox and Eagle, Av., 651 f. The allusions are brief, the fables popular.

(a) *The Wasps*. Fable is thickest in the Wasps. In the first two-thirds of the play, Philocleon is dicastic, in the last third, boorish. His use of the Fable is one of the motifs of his boorishness. When Philocleon had unwittingly acquitted the Dog of stealing the cheese (vv. 910, 1002), Bdelycleon consoles his father with the promise of a life of feasting and sight-seeing in the company of the select and cultured (vv. 1003 ff., 1174). He proceeds to replace the old man's rags with Persian robes and Spartan slippers (vv. 1132, 1158), the father sweltering under his new raiment (v. 1156). To raiment etiquette must be added. Bdelycleon accordingly hears his father a lesson on polite conversation. Philocleon is brimful of good stories, one of Lamia, another of Cardopion and his mother. But these are fabrications (μῦθοι, v. 1179). Bdelycleon calls for "matters of human interest," τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, the usual theme of conversation, that is, παρ' ἰπότηαν, gossip, τὰ κατ' οἰκίαν. Philocleon knows a matter strictly domestic, πάνυ κατ' οἰκίαν, and begins: οὕτω πῶτ' ἦν μὲς καὶ γαλῇ. This disgusts Bdelycleon, and he reads his father a critique. It is part of the fun that Philocleon, as dicast, has ridiculed the telling of Fables to a jury, but here as boor (σκαίε καπαίδευτε, v. 1183), his real nature (v. 1433), uses one himself. Bdelycleon tries his father further, and finds him an adept at the catch (v. 1249). Philocleon is afraid of wine, however, fearing a fine for violence done when in his cups (vv. 1253 ff.). "Not in the case of gentlemen," says Bdelycleon, humorously (v. 1256). "Just give them a joke of Aesop or from Sybaris, that you have heard at the banquet, to raise a laugh, and you will be let off" (v. 1260 f.). Prevented before from telling Fables (v. 1183), Philocleon must now con another string of them (v. 1262). The banquet comes off. Philocleon is the greatest brawler of them all (v. 1300). As he comes reeling out, he upsets a baker-woman's basket with his torch (v. 1390). Bdelycleon warns him of arrest, but he is ready, and proceeds bombastically to tell a "tale of Aesop," wherein the baker-woman figures as a drunken slut (v.

1401 ff.). A summoner now appears, but willing to compromise (v. 1415 ff.) listens while Philocleon tells him a male and a female Sybaritic story. At this Bdelycleon bundles his father off but not before the latter begins a fable of vengeance, of the Beetle and Eagle, told by Aesop to those about to execute him (v. 1446 ff.):

(ΦΙΛ) Αἴσωπον οἱ Δελφοί ποτ' (ΒΔΕ) ὀλίγον μοι μέλει.

(ΦΙΛ) φιάλην ἐπητιῶντο κλέψαι τοῦ θεοῦ.

ὁ δ' ἔλεξεν αὐτοῖς, ὥς ὁ κάνθαρός ποτε.

Philocleon here poses as a martyr and as an Aesop, as he had done with the baker-woman (v. 1401). *In vino veritas*, and Philocleon is most a boor when drunk. Aesop is also ridiculed, as is Socrates in the Clouds.

The Fable like the Proverb befits the old who are also wise. (Cf. Arist., *Rhet.*, 2, 21, 51; Quintil., *Inst.*, 8, 5, 8). But the garrulity and childishness of the aged, especially if unlettered, are a frequent butt of comedy. Cf. the familiar proverb, *δὺς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες*. Cf. other examples in H. Koch, *Sprich.*, 1892, p. 7. Hence also, Fable is parody in the mouth of Philocleon, as in that of Trygaeus, Pax, 129, Pisthetaerus, Av., 652, the old women, Lys., 695. The first three of these are also full of Proverbs. Bauck, *De prov. apud Aristoph.*, (quoting Rohdewald), p. 16. The Atalanta story of the old men, Lys., 781 ff., is near to the sphere of Fable and Proverb. It is highly parodic. Second childhood was telling a story of first childhood (*ὅν ποτ' ἤκουσ' αὐτὸς ἔτι παῖς ὢν*). The combination of logaoedic and choral metre is humorous (Schmidt, *Kunstformen*, 2, ccciii); the story itself is twisted (Schol., ad loc.), and the whole capped almost foot for foot by a like story from the old women (Schmidt, l. c.). Cf. the Sybaris tales, Vesp., 1427 ff., 1435 ff. Of somewhat similar tone is the creation legend of Pisthetaerus to the Bird Assembly in stately anapaests (v. 475). To the Birds it was a historical *παράδειγμα*, to the audience a myth-travesty. Keller, *Tiere*, p. 253, connects this story with an Egyptian Phoenix-myth.

The large allusion to Fable and the like in the Wasps shows

an attempt to popularize the play after the failure of the too philosophical *Clouds* the year before. The Fable may be one of the "burlesque elements" of early Ionic comedy, which survived in Aristophanes. Cf. Starkie, xxiii. It is all in the last part of the play and has nothing to do with the action.

(b) *The Peace*. The Beetle and Eagle Fable appears also in Pax, 127 ff., but with an original touch :

τίς δ' ἠπίνοιά σουσὶν ὥστε κἀνθαρὼν
 ζεύξαντ' ἐλαύνειν εἰς θεούς, ὃ παππία;
 ἐν τοῖσιν Αἰσώπου λόγοις ἐξευρέθη
 μόνος πετεινῶν εἰς θεοὺς ἀφιγμένος.
 ἄπιστον εἶπας μῦθον, ὃ πάτερ πάτερ,
 ὅπως κάκοσμον ζῶον ἦλθεν εἰς θεούς.
 ἦλθεν κατ' ἔχθραν ἀετοῦ πάλαι ποτέ,
 ὃ' ἐκκυλίνδων κἀντιτιμωρούμενος.

The *κόρη* would not likely have missed the point of the story if the usual version had been told. Schol., Lys., 695, in explaining the Proverb derived from this fable, speaks only of the destruction of the Eagle's eggs by the Beetle, who had been wronged by the Eagle. In Trygaeus's version, the Zeus scene in the story is märchenhaft and may have been humorously added to justify Trygaeus's use of his novel air-steed. Of course, it is all fathered upon Aesop. Cf. Av., 471, Vesp., 1401.

(c) *The Birds*. The fable of the Fox and Eagle is found in Av., 651 ff. :

ὄρα νυν ὡς ἐν Αἰσώπου λόγοις
 ἐστὶν λεγόμενον δὴ τι, τὴν ἀλώπεχ', ὡς
 φλαύρως ἐκοινώνησεν ἀετῷ ποτέ.

It is humorously cited by Peisthetaerus to show that Flesh and Fowl, the two travelers and the Birds, could not consort on an equal footing. The hoopoe answers that there is a root which if they eat they may fly also. In Babrius, 99, the Eagle proposes a partnership with the Lion, which is rejected, Peisthetaerus-like, by the Lion. Peisthetaerus knows his Aesop well. So does Trygaeus.

(Cf. ἐξευρέθη, Pax, 129). Not to do so is the mark of the highest ignorance. Cf. Av., 471, and Schol., ad loc.

ἀμαθὴς γὰρ ἔφυς κοῦ πολυπράγμων, οὐδ' Αἴσωπον πεπάτηκας,
ὃς ἔφασκε λέγων κορυδὸν πάντων πρῶτην ὄρνιθα γενέσθαι.

(d) *Lysistrata*. The formation of Proverb from Fable, as illustrated in Lys., 695, may be noted. This may be a witty allusion to the fable of the Beetle and Eagle, becoming afterwards proverbial. Cf. Schol., ad loc. The metrical form is not that of the Proverb proper, for the emphatic use of the first and second persons interferes: ἀετὸν τίκτοντα κάνθαρός σε μαιεύσομαι. Eustathius (Hom., Il., 24, 317, p. 1352, 40) explains the Fable after Aristophanes. He adds that the Beetle in the story actually did throw out the eggs of the Eagle. He keeps the first person, ἀετὸν κάνθαρος μαιεύσομαι. So does Macarius (1, 36). The other paroemiographers, however, seem to have forgotten the story, and explain the Proverb from natural history. The form is ἀετὸν κάνθαρος μαιεύεται. Cf. Xenob., 1, 20; Diogen., 2, 44; Diogen., Ven., 1, 65; Gregor, Cyp. M., 1, 55.

In the history of this proverb, we see the colloquial tendency to ellipsis in Proverbs. The characters of Fable remain, and also the copula to denote the relationship. But all else is frequently dispensed with, even to the verb, the juxtaposition of the types being sufficient. The other parts of the original are all worn off as from a much-used coin. E. g. the expression ἅμα μῦθος ἔην τετέλεστό τε ἔργον, Hom., Il., 19, 242, becomes ἅμ' ἔπος, ἅμ' ἔργον, in Zenob., 1, 77.

The fables of Aristophanes are all labelled; Vesp., 1182, ὡς οὔτω ποτέ (cf. οὔτω δῆ, Plato, Phaedr., 237, B, Xen., Mem., 2, 7, 13); Lys., 784, ποτέ; Av., 652 f., ὡς . . . ποτέ; Pax, 133, πάλαι ποτέ; Vesp., 1446, οἱ Δελφοί ποτ', followed humorously by ὡς ὁ κάνθαρός ποτε in v. 1448.

(e) *Summary*. We may see parody everywhere in Aristophanes's use of Fable. (1) In the setting, (2) in the popular iambic metre, (3) in the types.

The fable types are all parodied. In Vesp., 1446, Philocleon

is as weak against Bdelycleon as the Beetle against the Eagle, but he is confident of getting the better in the end. In Pax., 129, the Beetle is not a type but a travesty of the Beetle in the fable, now a huge *ἰπποκάνθαρος*. Not the Beetle, but the Eagle was the only bird of Zeus. (Keller, *Tiere*, 238, 251, 254). In Lys., 695, the old men are compared to the mother Eagle whom the old women as Beetles will assail in their wrath. With the Beetle pitted against the Eagle, compare the proverb of the Fox and Hedgehog, *ἀλώπηξ πολλὰ, ἐχίνος ἐν μέγα*. (Cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 423, E.) Keller (*Tiere*, p. 268 f.), makes Egypt the home of the Beetle, whence he derives the fable.

The Fable, therefore, in Aristophanes, is a parody of the popular, placed in the mouth of the rustic, used before juries, told at banquets. In like manner the Comic Poets ridiculed the popular fondness for Riddles. Cf. Ohlert, *Rätsel*, p. 63. So Proverbs were parodied; e. g. *Ran.*, 191, *τὸν περὶ κρεῶν νευαυμάχηκε*, especially if a homely one chanced to be used by a Tragic Poet. (Cf. Linde, *de prov. apud tragicos Graecos usu*, pp. 7, 9.) Comedy always turns the humorous side out. The more naïve days of Stesichorus, also, when the Fable was high in honor with the whole people, had been superseded by the age of culture. Now the Fable was boorish. The later Greek and the Roman Comic poets seem to have disdained its use even in parody, although in Plautus, for instance, homely proverbs abound. (Wyss., *Sprich. bei den Röm. Komik.*, p. 110 ff.). As personal caricature, even, Aristophanes does not employ the Fable, although he so uses the Riddle, as against Cleonymus (*Vesp.*, 23). This was a frequent practice after the liberty of comic attack had been suppressed. (Ohlert, *op. cit.*, p. 102). The Proverb is also used as a general satire in *Thesmo.*, 520 ff.:

τὴν παροιμίαν δ' ἐπαινῶ
τὴν παλαιάν, ὑπὸ λίθῳ γὰρ
παντί που χρῆ
μὴ δάκη ῥήτωρ ἀθρεῖν.

Cf. Martin, *Auf dem Gebiete des Griech. Sprichw.*, p. 4; and the political Märchen, e. g., *Eq.*, 415, against Cleon. (Zielinski,

Märchenkomödie, 6 ff.). Thus we see an absence of personal invective as in Archilochus, and a mere general travesty of rusticity in Aristophanes's use of the Fable. In this therefore, as in many other things, Aristophanes is transitional between the older direct personal lampoon, and the later dramatic or satiric method of making general types the butt of ridicule. Cf. the Roman writers of Comedy following the Greek New Comedy. Even Lucilius can hardly have used his fable of the Fox and Sick Lion (frg. 778 ff., Mueller, xxx, 66-69) in direct personal attack, despite Horace's characteristic of the Lucilian method (Sat., 2, 1, 39) for Roman Satire "professed at least to be animated not by private enmity but by public spirit." Cf. Sellar, *Roman Poets of the Republic*, p. 218. Horace's use of Fable is partly in the manner of Aristophanes, but always shows the delicate hand of the literary artist, who never makes fun merely for fun's sake. So Ennius, in his fable of the Piper and Fishes, frg. 482 B, *subulo quondam marinas propter astatat plagas*, with its artistic grouping of words, its festive trochaic measure (cf. Christ, *Metrik*, pp. 294, 301) and probable epimyth, is but a forerunner of Horace and Phaedrus, as Callimachus, with his Olive-Laurel Fable, frg. 93, A and B, cast in the revived but fangless Seazon of Hipponax with literary plant types, literary epithets, and revived Ionisms, is the precursor of Babrius, if not of Avianus. None of these are invective in tone. Neither is Fable allusion in Aristophanes. In short, even in the Wasps, where Philocleon is a manner of Demos, the satire is in the manner of the new Comedy, for Philocleon at the end of the Wasps is more dotard than citizen. Cf. Strepsiades, in the Clouds. The Aristophanic Fable is wholly parodic.

6. PHILOSOPHY. SOCRATES, ANTISTHENES.

(1). Socrates. We may best associate the two fables put in the mouth of Socrates by [Plato] (Alcibiades, 123 A) and Xenophon (Memorabilia, 2, 7, 13) with Socrates himself rather than with the authors who actually wrote them. Thus we may consider the Fable in this section as a device of Socratic philosophy.

Hitherto we have found in the homely Epic teaching of

Hesiod, in the personal attack of Archilochus and the buffoonery of Aristophanes, that where the Proverb and Maxims of a homely sort abound, there Fable also is likely to abound; that where familiarity of tone, angry or playful, is present, there is the Fable likely to be found also. Now playfulness as well as homeliness is a strong trait of the human Socrates. Cf. Newhall, *Dramatic and Mimetic Features of the Gorgias of Plato*, p. 16 ff. As is well shown in the pages cited, Socrates in his free and easy, seemingly modest way, employed interjections, oaths, word-play and the like, the *figura etymologica* in the manner of popular jingle, an abundance of proverbs, and in general "a very loose and careless style, which imitates the structure of easy conversation." Cf. also Grünwald, *Sprichwörter bei Plato*, p. 4. In homeliness and gnostic content, Fable lent itself readily to the homespun philosophic method of this philosopher, and although Fable is a mark of boorishness in the old man Philocleon (Aristophanes, *Vesp.*) it is an appropriate didactic device in the elderly philosopher Socrates. Socrates himself, we know, felt a kinship for Aesop, whom he acknowledged as his master in illustration, cf. *Phaedo*, 3C, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι ὡς κτλ, and (Plato) *Alcibiades*, 123A, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον, where the catchword ἀτεχνῶς is emphatic.

Socrates even versified some of the fables of Aesop if we may believe *Phaedo* 4, although the authenticity of the Fable sometimes attributed to him (Hiller, xxxvii) is questionable. (Cf. Schanz, *Hermes*, 29, p. 597 ff.). It is especially significant that Socrates refers to Aesop twice in his last talk with his friends.

We will consider the fables separately, and first the allusion in the *Alcibiades* of (Plato) 123A.

Fable A. Socrates has been alleging that the Gold of Greece and of all the world had been going to Sparta, and none of it returning,

κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον, ὃν ἡ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς τὸν λέοντα εἶπε,
καὶ τοῦ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσιόντος μὲν τὰ ἔχνη τὰ
ἐκεῖσε τετραμμένα δῆλα, ἐξιόντος δὲ οὐδαμῇ ἂν τις ἴδοι.

This allusion, therefore, is but a homely though witty figure, and used in the happy manner of Socratic illustration. It is half-jest and whole earnest. The types are nothing, the Lion and Fox being used rather sarcastically. The illustration simply shows what anyone with common sense, like the Fox, could easily see to be the case: Sparta was getting richer, the rest of Greece poorer. It is no attempt to show that Sparta deserved to be lionized in any sense of the word. The Lion, was, of course, the natural king of beasts. Quintilian remarks on the homeliness of this fable in *Inst. or.*, 5, 11, 20. Horace humorously makes himself the Fox, the "*profanum vulgus*" the Lion in *Epp.*, 1, 1, 73, 5. Cf. *Sat.*, 2, 3, 186.

*Olim quod volpes aegroto cauta leoni
Respondit, referam: 'quia me vestigia terrent,
Omnia te adversum spectantia nulla retrorsum.'*

Similarly the Socratic allusion is brief but comprehensive. We cannot remark otherwise on its style except to say that it assumes the form of a loose though antithetical complex. The same fable is given in Babrius, 103.

Fable B. The second Fable attributed to Socrates is told by Xenophon in *Memorabilia*, 2, 7, 13.

The setting is this: Aristarchus has made complaint to Socrates concerning the difficulty of supporting a large family of female relatives who had come to him for refuge during the time of party strife. He has given them work to do to help in their own support, and they are content with that but they criticize him as the only idler on the premises. Socrates bids him tell them the following fable:

φασὶ γὰρ, ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τὰ ζῷα, τὴν οὖν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἰπεῖν · ‘Θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, ὃς ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς καὶ ἑριά σοι καὶ ἄρνας καὶ τυρὸν παρεχούσαις οὐδὲν δίδως ὃ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λάβωμεν, τῷ δὲ κυνὶ, ὃς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτό σοι παρέχει, μεταδίδως οὐπὲρ αὐτὸς ἔχεις σίτου.’ τὸν κύνα οὖν ἀκούσαντα εἰπεῖν · ‘Ναὶ μὰ Δία · ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶμι ὃ καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτὰς σάζων, ὥστε μήτε ὑπ’

ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἀρπάζεσθαι · ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς γε, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ προφυλάττοιμι ὑμᾶς, οὐδ' ἂν νέμεσθαι δύναισθε, φοβούμεναι μὴ ἀπόλησθε' οὕτω δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα συγχωρήσαι τὸν κύνα προτιμᾶσθαι.

The application of the fable is made thus :

καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐκείναις λέγε ὅτι ἀντὶ κυνὸς εἰ φύλαξ καὶ ἐπιμητηγής, καὶ διὰ σὲ οὐδ' ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἀδικούμεναι ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἡδέως ἐργαζόμεναι ζῶσιν.

This fable will show several very interesting deviations from any which have been previously discussed, as examination will reveal.

(1) In regard to ἀφέλεια. (a) Structure. We have now passed beyond the time when the εἰρομένη λέξις was customary in literature, although the careless style of Socrates would approximate this but for the highly philosophical content of his words, compelling a certain periodicity. The Fable style of Aristotle, therefore, as we have noted above, is in marked contrast to that of this fable in that the former is marked by εἰρομένη λέξις, while the latter is highly periodic. Indeed there is rhetoric from beginning to end. There are (1) rounded phrases : ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τὰ ζῶα; τὴν οἶν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἰπεῖν : θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, the last an emphatic and polished phrase ; so with μεταδίδως οὐπερ αὐτὸς ἔχεις σίτου. (2) Strong antithesis and parallelism : ἡμῖν μὲν . . . παρεχούσαις οὐδὲν δίδως / τῷ δὲ κυνί, ὃς οὐδὲν . . . παρέχει, μεταδίδως . . . σίτου; or these employed with word for word correspondent, in equal cola, μήτε ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι, μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἀρπάζεσθαι. This readily suggests the style of Xenophon's speeches in the Anabasis, e. g., the speech of Clearchus, Anab., 1, c. 3, 5, 6 :

καὶ οὐποτε ἐρεῖ οὐδεὶς ὡς ἐγώ, "Ἕλληνας ἀγαγὼν εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, προδοὺς τοὺς "Ἕλληνας τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων φιλίαν εἰλόμην, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλετε πείθεσθαι, ἐγὼ σὺν ὑμῖν ἔφθομαι καὶ ὃ τι ἂν δέῃ πείσομαι.

Indeed we have in this fable the acme of rhetoric for any Greek fable. We can find no parallel anywhere in Latin either, except in Livy's fable of the Belly and Members, told by Agrippa to the revolting plebeians, where all the figures above referred to and others are exemplified (Livy, 2, 32), which is quoted with comment :

Is intromissus in castra prisco illo dicendi et horrido modo nihil aliud quam hoc narrasse fertur: tempore, quo in homine non, ut nunc, omnia in unum consentientia, sed singulis membris suum cuique consilium, suus sermo fuerit, indignatas reliquas partes sua cura, suo labore ac ministerio ventri omnia quaeri, ventrem in medio quietum nihil aliud quam datis voluptatibus frui; conspirasse inde, ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nec os acciperet datum, nec dentes conficerent. Hac ira dum ventrem fame domare vellent, ipsa una membra totumque corpus ad extremam tabem venisse. Inde apparuisse ventris quoque haud segne ministerium esse, nec magis ali quam alere eum reddentem in omnes corporis partes hunc, quo vivimus vigenusque, divisum pariter in venas, maturum confecto cibo sanguinem. Comparando hinc, quam intestina corporis seditio similis esset irae plebis in patres, flexisse mentes hominum.

Here we have an ultra display of oratory in the lofty style of a usual Livian harangue with all the Livian *μακρολογία* (Quintilian, Inst. or., 8, 3, 53) and yet with plenty of true *πάθος*. The rhetorical is shown in the antithesis and parallelism continued throughout, accompanied by alliteration: *reliquas partes / ventrum; suo labore / ventri; ne manus / nec os / nec dentes; ali / alere; quaeri / frui; in medio quietum / datis voluptatibus frui*. Alliteration is added in: *suum cuique consilium, suus sermo, sua cura, suo labore, vivimus vigenusque*. Cf. *confecto cibo*. This alliteration is not popular but rhetorical. Cf. Wölfflin, rev. of Keller's *Grammatische Aufsätze*, Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie, 9, p. 567. Tacitus used much of it in his speeches, l. c., p. 573. There is also tautology: *labore ac ministerio; ipsa una membra totumque corpus*; and variety of expression is sought: *singulis membris, reliquas partes, ipsa una membra totumque corpus, omnes corporis partes*. Descriptive adjectives are used: *quietum*,

segne, maturum. Fame domare and in extremam tabem venisse are poetical. The personification of the members is similarly rhetorically vivid: *consentiebant, consilium, sermo, indignatas; cura, labore, ministerio; conspirasse, hac ira . . . vellent*. So of the Belly: *quietum, datis voluptatibus frui, haud segne ministerium, alere*. Most rhetorical of all is the division of clause to parallel division of thought with cola nearly equal: *ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nec os acciperet datum, nec dentes conficerent; reddentem in omnes corporis partes hunc, divisum pariter in venas, maturum confecto cibo sanguinem*. The last is in inverse order of the process. Even Aphthonius, W. 2, 573, prescribes that in Fable all *δεινότης* and *περιοδική ἀπαγγελία* should be avoided.

In fine, Livy suits his style to the speaker (*virum facundum*) rather than to the time and the matter of his address. The later Roman, try as he might, lacked the imagination necessary to understand his earlier countrymen. (Taine, *Essai sur Tite Live*, p. 16). Livy does not intend this fable to be *horridus*. He develops it like any other harangue. So it savors of the study not of the assembly (cf. *Ibid.*, op. cit., p. 318), although perhaps this fable reveals the republicanism of Livy. Cf. *Ibid.*, op. cit., p. 6 ff. Hence it is plain that Livy, at the end of a long period of rhetorical study, quite out-Xenophons Xenophon in lofty rhetoric, yet both alike are pouring the new wine of a rhetorical style into the old bottle of the Fable.

So in our Xenophon fable the whole story is closely argumentative, while the individual cola are about equal in length, and the address of the Sheep is made almost exactly the same length as that of the Dog. Indeed the fable consists almost entirely of these two highly rhetorical sections, the narrative being largely suppressed. We might even consider these two parts the two parts of an *ἀγών* on the Employer and the Employee. The style throughout therefore is even more rhetorical than that of the context which is quite conversational in tone. See further below on *ἐνάργεια*.

(b) Diction. The diction also is purposely polished and graceful, even poetical. Cf. *φωνήεντα*. So we will consider it further in relation to

(2) *τραχύτης*. Plainly the style is not *τραχύς* but *γλυκός* throughout. To begin with, the setting is *märchenhaft*. The usual method of introducing a Fable is οὕτω δὴ, ἦν ποτε or φασί with the story partly or wholly in *oratio obliqua*. (Livy preserves the O. O. form throughout making it more rhetorical and impersonal than here). Xenophon begins his fable however in a mythical manner, φασὶ γάρ, ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τὰ ζῷα τὴν οἶν εἰπεῖν. Livy does the same, but in a long circumlocution with much less art: *tempore quo in homine non ut nunc, omnia in unum consentientia, sed singulis membris suum cuique consilium, suus sermo fuerit*. Babrius also has in his prologue a mythical background for his fables as well as a reference to Aesop. He refers (I Pr., 6 f.) to the Golden Age as the age of speaking animals. Phaedrus and Avianus give no such background, but think it enough to trace the department of Fable back to Aesop, which Xenophon does not do in our fable. Nor yet does Xenophon aim merely to be *γλυκός* as does Babrius in telling the same story (No. 128). The argument in Babrius is obscured by the *Märchen* elements; in Xenophon, the mythological coloring of personification is slight and artistically incidental, the argument being clearly and forcefully brought to the front. Yet we have the anaphoric allusion of τὴν οἶν referring to the story as such (cf. ὁ καρκίνος, Scolion, 16, τὴν κερδῶ, Lucian, Hermotimus, c. 84); while φασὶ γάρ and λέγεται are conventional ways of referring to Fable or Proverb (cf. Plato, *passim*).

(3) *σαφήνεια*. There is clearness, but not for the usual reasons. There is little of description at all. It is comprised in τὴν οἶν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἰπεῖν; ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς καὶ ἑριά σοι καὶ ἄρνας καὶ τυρὸν παρεχούσαις and τὸν κύνα οἶν ἀκούσαντα εἰπεῖν. The scene is not described at all otherwise. But in the argument, there is great clearness because of the simplicity and careful periodic structure of the whole. In Babrius, with much more description and with fanciful coloring there is much less of clearness.

(4) *συντομία*. The whole is sententiously brief, all the more for the absence of scenic description. No other Greek fable has

so large a proportion of argument. The Rhetors indeed prescribed that animals should not speak so rhetorically, especially Sheep. Cf. Walz 2, 159. τὰ πρόβατα εὐήθη τε καὶ μῶρα should speak ἐκ λόγων τῶν τῇ φύσει ἁρμοζόντων. Yet the argument here though comprehensive is commendably brief and to the point nevertheless.

(5) *ἐνάρχεια*. The types here are almost colorless, Dog and Sheep representing naturally peaceful agents. Wild animals having more of natural ferocity are better types of men because of their spirit. Such make the strongest Fable characters, and are capable of strong invective use. The domestic animals, such as the Dog, cf. Hom., Od., 2, 11 ; 17, 62, and the Sheep, stand for more peaceful traits of character. They approximate in mildness the personified plants in Fable, such as Callimachus uses in his fable, frg. 93a, b, the Laurel representing the beautiful, and the Olive the useful in life. Cf. the three plant Fables in Babrius, 36, 64, 178. The plant fables of Phaedrus (cf. Prol., 1, 6) are lost.

Our story is therefore a Fable of Peace. Hence there is no need of characterization. Indeed each character argues away like a polite although a very earnest philosopher. Cf. the expostulation *θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς* and the oath *Ναὶ μὰ Δία*, a mirthful touch, suggestive of Socrates himself. Cf. Newhall, op. cit., p. 18.

(6) *Special Purpose of the fable*. The whole story, as we have seen, is intended to be gracefully told. This is to the end of its being optimistic in tone, in order that Socrates by the telling of it may encourage both the disheartened Aristarchus and his complaining relatives. It was a gloomy time in Athens (cf. Lysias, Contra. Erat. passim), and the cheery optimism of Socrates no doubt did much to dispel the gloom amongst his wide circle of friends. Like Hesiod in his Works and Days, Socrates suggests as a remedy for the ills of life congenial toil. They are both right. There is also humor in the story of Socrates. Cf. the oath, and the adaptation of gender in the characters ; Babrius at any rate has the gender reversed. In fine, the whole is playful in tone and familiarly confidential, as the Fable is between friends, and yet it has a

serious aim in illustrating a great principle of economics, that some must toil and others must guard and plan, cf. φύλαξ καὶ ἐπιμελητής, and that in either case the laborer is worthy of his hire. The story is also made all the more effective by its graceful, polite γλυκύτης, so characteristic of Socrates himself.

In concluding, we cannot but infer that Xenophon is consciously avoiding the now old-fashioned tone of homeliness in the Fable when told in its normal style, and chooses it rather as a medium of effective ethical exposition than as a part of the ἥθος of the philosopher himself, although in a general way it serves this purpose also. The two fables in short illustrate the two types of Horatian Fable, the homely and the more polished, e. g., Frog and Calf, Sat., 2, 3, 315 ff.; City and Country Mouse, Sat., 2, 6, 79 ff., cf. Proc. A. P. A., 1911, pp. xvi, xviii.

(2) *Antisthenes*. Socrates passed on his method of Fable illustration to his pupil Antisthenes, who was more plebeian, less speculative and more strictly practical. (Cf. Natorp, Pauly-Wissowa, 1, 2539 f., Blass, Att. Bered., 2, 334). Aristotle (Polit., 3, 13, 1284a.) alludes to one fable of Antisthenes, that of the Hares and Lions. The Hares sought an equal share in the sovereignty, to which the Lions replied, "where are your claws and your teeth?" (cf. Halm, 241). This fable probably belongs to the Politicus of Antisthenes (Mueller, De Antisthenes vita et scriptis, p. 46) which was directed against the demagogues at Athens (Athen., 5, p. 220D). Antisthenes ridiculed the attempt of the *populus* to cope with the oligarchs. (Mueller, l. c.). Aristotle's use of the fable is to the same effect.

This fable is more naïve inasmuch as the types are more prominent. The Lion represents power, nobility and courage. Cf. Arist., 488 b17 (ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐγενῆ, οἶον λέων) cf. Pind., I, 4, 80. The Hare was a typical coward. Cf. Posidipp., χορ, 1, 9; Dem., 314, 24.

This political fable is a case where Antisthenes introduced the ῥητορικὸν γένος into his philosophical writings. Cf. Natorp, op. cit., 2541. Antisthenes had formerly been a rhetor. Ibid., l. c., 2538. Aristotle, though no admirer of Antisthenes (cf. Metaph.,

4, 29, 8, 3), commends the force of such a Fable in the mouth of an imaginary statesman eminent in virtue and power. Cicero (ad Att., 1238) regards Antisthenes as *acutus* rather than *eruditus*.

Probably the popular philosophers frequently used the Fable as a didactic device down past the time of Horace. Cf. his parody of the Stoic method in the Frog and Calf, Sat., 2, 3, 314 ff. So Aristides attacks the Cynics (*ὑπέρ τῶν τετάρων*, p. 307, 5. Cf. Crus., Rh. M., 49, 307), and Lucian, the Stoics, Hermot., 85, with their own weapons. Maximus Tyrius suggests (1, 3, 30R) that Epicurus could have used the fable of the Stag, Lion and Fox in defence of Ἡδονή. This sort of teaching (or preaching) by means of Fable was done by the Rhetoricians along with the teaching of Rhetoric and has been carried on down through the Middle Ages to modern times, making a continuous literary succession from Hesiod to the present moment.

Thus our treatment has shown the normal literary sphere of Fable, its various stylistic employment in detail in the Classical Greek Literature, and also by illustration in the subsequent Greek and Roman Literature. It has also shown that everywhere and inevitably Fable is Fable, and that its method of employment in each instance is a sure stylistic test both for the individual author who uses it and for his department.

VITA

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